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CHAPTER I

INTENT OF THE STUDY ON RECA LL AND

A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

In California municipal politics re call has p l ayed a
conspicuous role .

It has cons i stent l y served as a source of con-

troversy whenever it is und ertaken .

\.Jhile it is a pr inciple

inspired by the direct democracy campaign of the California prog r essives in the ear ly twentieth century, it remains as an evolving legal
process and dynamic political i ssue within the context of
California politica l history.

I.

INTENT OF THE STUDY

In recent literature on American community and national
politics the recurr ing observa t ion is ma de· that members of the
e l ectorate feel they are losing control of their politi ca l
destiny.

Such forces that mitiga te against account ability and

responsiveness by e l ected officials to their constitue n cy are
indeed import ant and ought to be more fully understood .

At the

same time there needs to be ·a conscious effort t o r evit al ize
~

structures avai l able to the e l ectorate whi ch give them control
and direction of their polit i cal s ituation.
The author believes that reca ll, as '-Je ll as other tools of
direc t democracy, is an area that holds great promise for
scholarly, as '"e ll as ac tion- oriented resear ch,

The recal l process

ought to be a more politica lly potent recourse to entrenched

2

officials \-Jho fa il to perceive the proper nature of their account ability.
There i s a need to more fully explore those areas \-Jhich can
give ba ck to pe ople some fe e ling of maste ry over their lives.

This

study is based on the premise that recall is an area \.Jhich-- if
more fully und erstood from a deve lopme nt a l perspective -- might
continue to serve as a us eful t ool in the democratic proce s s .
The author hopes th a t the pap er \-Jill render a context in \-Jhich
Ca lifornia recall \-Jill be better understood and in which future
change s will be amenable not only to technica l r e quirements, but
to relevant soc ial and politica l needs as well.
II.

REVIE\-1 OF THE LITERATURE

The literature on recall in - Ca li fornia is not extensive.
In 1930 Freder ick Bird and Fra ncis Ryan completed the only thorough
st udy of recall in California.

A few cursory studies h ave been

compiled s ince 1930 with a lmos t no a ttempt to chronicle the l egal
and hi s t or ical deve lopme nt of recall.
Lite rature

~

the

in ceptio~

and

~r ly

deve lopmen t of

~call .

Bird and Ryan h ave produc·ed_ the mos t comprehe nsive s tudy of r eca ll
dea ling wi th the development of the reca ll c oncep t and its application
fo llm-1ing adoption in 1911. 1
a r esearch project mu st begin.

Th i s s tudy is the basic work fr om which
Unfortuna t e l y , no similar work has

lFrederick L.Bird and Francis M. Ryan.

111e Reca ll of Public

O fficer~: !:_ ~t:ud y ~E t he_ ~ation of the ~eca ll in C[tTiforu{;-(Nc\-7

York : The MacMillan Company, 1930).
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been comple t ed dealing with the period through t he thir ties to the
present.
Valuable background information on the politics surrounding
the early r eca ll concept can be found in George Mo\-Jry 1 s excellent
study, Th e California Progr essives. 2

Mowry i s particular ly useful

in h is tr ea tment of a pre -1911 discussion of r e call as a progressive poli cy .
Franklin Hichb orn3 is an invaluable s ource for interpreting
le gislative intent and tracing the leg isl at ive development of r ecal l.
Hichborn has focused upon the actual deb a t es and portrays the moo'd
of the le gislative proceed ings, thus providing important insight
into the initia l stages of recal l development in the s tat e .
The Californi a Cons titution Revis ion Commi ssion i n 1968
publi shed an e xce lle nt analysis of the State Constitu tiona l
amendment dealing \-Jith r eca ll . 4

This stud y provide s many u seful

insight s i nto the r at iona le of certain provi s ions in the procedure .
It also gives a most adequate treatment of the general scope · of
recall as a s t a t e constitutional princip l e .
Recent studies focusin&_ on muni c ipal r eca ll in California .
Saul Weinga rten, former City Attorney of Seas ide,in pap ers prepared

2George Mowry . Th e Cali fornia Progressives (Berke l ey :
Univer sity of Ca lifor nia Press, 1951) .
3Franklin Hichborn . .Hichborn 1 s Leg i s l a tive Bulle tin : Story
of the Californ ia Legis l ature 1911, 1915 (San Franc isco : J ames H.
Barry Compony, 19ll, 191 5).
L1California

Constitution Revision Commission, Ar ticle XXIII.. :
Re ca ll Ba ckground Study, Cons t i tut ion Revision Cotnmis sion, San
Francisco, Ca li forni a , 1968.

4

for the city attorneys of the League of California Cities, reviewed
the techni ca lities of r ecal l and important recent cascs,S

Graham

Ritchie, City Attorney of the City of Industry, included a section
on recall i n hi s paper entitled ''Recent Developments in Initiative,
Referendum and Recall Law ,'' delivered to the same organization in
1967,6
F. Armand Magid of Stanford performed an invalu ab le task in
s urveying a ll school district recall elections between 1945 and
1965.7

His study provided valuable insights concerning the size

of districts in which recall e l ections occur and indicated the
types of districts in which they occur.

Although this study does

not de al with school district recall la,v, Magid provided useful
hi storical data and help ful comnentary,

He also provide d locations

for r esearch for another Stanford doctoral candidate,

James A.

Ke lly, 'vho studied a sample of recall districts to determine '"hether

Ssaul Weingarten, "Recall Elections in Gener a l Law Cities,"
Paper read to the City Attorney's Department, League of California
Cities, October 30, 1956.
6Graham A. Ritchie, "Recent Developme nts in Initiative,
Referendum, and Re call Lmv," Study on file in the City Attorney's
Department, Lea gue of California Cities, San Francisco, 1967; See
a l so Hartley H. Bush, "Initr8'tive , Referendum, and Recall -- 1970,"
Study on file at the League of California Cities, Oakland, 1970 ,
7Fay Armand Ma gid, "The Reca ll Elec tion of School Board
Members in California 1946-1965." Dissertation presented to the
School of Education, Stanford University, 1967.
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recall elections serve as tools of conflict resolution . B Both of
these studies are sophisticated, quantitative reviews of the recall
phenomen on.
III.

SIGNIFICANCE AND IDEOLOGICAL
ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY

Recall as a subject for debate and research has
neg lected.

no~

been

There has been, since its inception, scholarly attention

given to various aspe cts of the pro ced ure.

Most treatments of re-

call have, ho1o7ever, been rather sketchy and piecemeal-- not giving
adequate attention to the concurrent historical and lega l developme:nta of the concept .• 9
This study attempts to present the legal development of
recall \.Jithin its hist'orica l and poli!:ical framev10rk and to inquire into its uniquely ''democratic " character that r emains as a
vestige of early twentieth century progressive reforms .
The author believes that observation s on the development of
r ecall will render important information on the state of direct
democracy procedures in one of the nation's largest and mos t
politically conspicuous states .

This information will provide

8Jnmes A. Kelly, Jr. "Conflict Resolution and California
School Board Elections." Dissertation presented to the. School of
Education, Stanford University, 1966 .
9rhe Bird and Ryan study is the outstanding exception to
this statement.

6

po litica l observe rs with deve lopme ntal patterns that will contri bute to specula tion s r ega r ding the future and potentia l of popula rly
controlled po litica l devices within the conventional politica l
system.
Hhilc thi s project was in the early stages of its preparation the author developed a bias in favor of strong popular che cks
against e l ected public officials .

Thi s id eo l ogical or ientation

stems part ia lly f rom the belief tha t political pmve r elites have
for too l ong- - and h ave far too easily- - usurped power f rom the
people, thus l ea ding to politica l hierarchies that sus t ain themselves in office thr ough means othe r than r espon s i veness to needs
of the e l ectm:ate .

Thus, the simpli s tic populist-oriented

solutions based upon people -control - - "pmver to the peopl e "-- of
the Progressives appeals to the writer's concept of proper
conflict resolution as unders tood within the contemporary demo cratic framework.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF RECALL
The concep tion of recall as a procedure for di smissing offic i als

irom public office has its origin in the Wes t ern democra tic t rad ition.
Careful s tudy of political his tory refutes the notion that r ecall is a
radical and irrespons ible experiment in democracy .

I ns te ad, it is

bas ed upon a concept which und erli es the Bill of Right s and is built
upon an ac cepted American political tr adition, the right of petition . l
While the bas i c concept of r e ca ll has b een deve lop ed in v arious politica l institutions throughout history, the concept of removal f r om
office earlier than the end of the t erm by popular vote is n ovel.
Histor i cal Antecedent s .

The Massachusetts c onsti t u tion of 1780

was the first American document to contain the recall principle.

In

Article VIII the cons titution stat ed:
In order to prevent those who are vested with authority
from becoming oppressors , the people have the right, at such
periods and in s uch manner as they shall establish by their form
of government, to cau se their public officers to return to
private lif e , and to fi ll u~ vacant places by certain and regular
elections and appointme nt s .

1 This observation was f irs t made by H. S. Gilbertson, " The Recall-Its Provis i ons and Signi ficance ," The Ann al s of the American Academy
of Political and Social_ Science , 43 :218, September, 1912 .
2Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 , Article VIII, Subdivision 1.
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8

Th e fir s t official provision for recall in America \-.Jas included
in the Articl es of Confe deration.3

Each state could recall its de l e -

gates from Con gr ess a t any time and send others in their places.
Recall \.Jas proposed to the Federal Convention by Edmund Ra ndolph on
May 29, 178 7 .

Randolph a nd others at the convention maintai ned a dis-

trust of unc hecked power \oli thin the gover nment branches.

Included in

the Randolph Plan, or Virginia Plan, \vas the provision ,.,h er eby the
first branch of the Na tional Legislature "ough t to be subject to
recall. "4

On June 12, 1787 , it \olas moved and seconded to strike out

the measure .
The actual use of recall dates back t o the fifth century B. C.
during the Age of Pericles .

It was among the great reforms that were

introduce d :Lnto the Athen ian government .

Recall was a ch eck aga inst

the pmo1erful Board of Ten Generals \vho had ris en to an exalted position
of l eadership Hithin the political hierarchy.

It

could be us ed agains t

the Generals at the conclusion of their annua l terms in office or they
could be i ndicted and recalled for malf easance at any time . S
3For the more convenient ma nagement of the general int e rest of the
United States , delega t es s hall be annually app ointed in such manner
as the Legislature of each s t a te shall direct, t o mee t in Congr ess on
the first Monday in November, in every year, wi th a power r es e rved to
each state to recall its de l egates , or any of them, at any time \vi thin
the year, and to send othe r s in t heir stead, for the remainder of the
year. Article V, Ar t icl es of Confederation.
4Max Farrand , The Record s of the Feder a l Convention of 1787 (Vol. I,
New Haven: Yale Un iversity Press , 1937), p. 20 .
SEdward McNa ll Burns, Wes tern Civilizations : Their His t ory and Their
Culture (sixth edi tion: Ne\ol York: w. vl. Norton and Company , I~,--1963), p. 156 .

9

Among famous Athenian s recalle d wer e Pericles f rom the office
of Gener.al in

l~30

B.C., 6

and other promine nt lumina rie s such as

Thucydides and Alcibi ades , 7

It seems fitting that reca ll originates

from a source so rich in the democratic tradition and to which modern
government owes so much .
George Ke nnan indi ca tes th at r eca ll operated in Novgor od the
Great -- the fir s t Russian Re public- ·· e ight hundred years ago and
under the lm.;r even the Prince t.;ras not immune from reca l l. 8
Perhaps closest to the American version of recall was the St.;ris s
Abbe ru f ung- - a form of r eca ll t.;rhich exist ed in severa l cantonal
institutions .

Though seldom use d it wa s initia t ed any time the proper

number of pet itioners reques ted it and a ma jority at the following
election favor ed it . 9
In the Second

Tre at~~

of Governme nt, John Locke, th e English

politica l theorist, defends the right of the peop l e to replace those
in t.;rhom "tru s t must ... be forfe ited . rrlO

Also in line with the

Eng li sh tradition is the concept underlying the practice of Bri ti sh
6Evelyn. Abbott, Peric le s and the Golden Age of Athens (New York :
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1891), p. 279.-7Ge orge F. Kennan, " The Direc t Rule of the People, " North
American Reviet.;r, 198 : 149 , August 13, 1913.
8Kennan, p. 149 .

9Robert C. Brook . Government and Politics of Switzerland (New
York: World Book Comp any, 1918), pp:-321-322 ; See a ls o William W.
Rappard. "The Initiative, Refere ndum, and Recall in Switzerland, " The
Anna ls of the Amer ica n Academy ~Politica l a nd Social Science , Lf3 : 127,
Se ptembe r, 1912 ; and a lso Margaret A. Schaffer, "Re call ," Yale Revie~,
18 : 206-209, August, 1909 .
10John Locke . Second Treatise on Government (Ch ap t er 13 , paragr aph
1Lf9) ,

10
Parliamentary e l ections .

While the specified "term" i s five years ,

an election may be called to express public confidence in the performance of elected members of Parli ament.
Similarly, in the early Boston city charter existed a provi s ion
.illustrating the purpos e of reca ll.

Every second year at the general

election voters were given an opportunity to express themselves
regarding the mayor's performance in office.

If a majority felt his

four year term should be termina ted they would vote to hold a special
municipa l election tha t year.

If the majority favored a special

election , the mayor was required to stand for re- election--automatically
cutting his term from four to two years-- or retire.ll
Recall exemplifies the same pure democratic spi rit characterized
by the early New England town meetings.

This concept of retaining

power in the hands of the people characterized the Populist and
Progressive reform movements in the lat e nineteenth and early t'ventieth
centu ri es .
The Progressive Movement .

Recall \vas ushered into California by

the influence of national reform parties intent on changing the condition and structure of government.

Bird and Ryan point out that recall

was advocated in the national platforms of the Socialis t Labor party in ·
189 2 and 1896 and in several of the Populist party state platf orms . 12
llBenjamin Devlitt, The Pr ogr ess ive Hovement (S eattle : University of
Washing ton Press , 1968), p. 234 .
12Frede rick L. Bir d and Franc i s M. Ryan, The Recall of Public
Officer1i.: !:__Study of _the Operation 9_~ the Re cal!_ in c;i ifo-;nia ( Ne'v
York: The NacM:Lllan Company, 19 30), p. 22.

11

In 1910 there were fourteen major points on which the two major
parties in California agreed and " made equally radical demands. "
Among the fourteen platform provisions \Y'as recall . 1 3
Progressivism could be found in both the Republican and Democratic
parties throughout the country.l4

A conviction shared by virtually all

Progressives was that the industrial revolution had given rise to various social and economic evils that needed immediate national attention .
California represented a microcosm of the national ills
Progressives were attempting to change.

~Y'hich

Hith the entrenched corrup -

tion and control of California politics by the Southern Pacific railroad,
the state \vas a central target for "radical" reforms.

Hhile big

business, such as the Southern Pacific, '"as the ultimate enemy of
Progressives , their proximate enemy was the political machine. 15
Most of the Progressives hoped to restore popular government as
they imagined it to have ex is ted in an earlier and purer age.

It \vas

believed that this could be done only by revitalizing the mora le of
the citizens and utilizing the newly aroused populist zeal to push
through changes in the mechanics of political life--direc t primaries ,
popular elections of Senators, initiative, r e fer endum, recal l, the
short bal lot, commission government and others .
l3John H. Caughey , California (New York : Prentice Hal l, Inc., 1940),
p . 512 .
14For a discuss ion of the bi-partisan aspects of Progressivism in
certain areas of California politics , see Franklin Hichborn' s political
editorial, Sacramento Bee , October 9, 1910.
15The corruption and domination of Californi a politics by the
Southe rn Pacific is b es t portrayed in Samuel G. Blythe , " Putti ng the
Rollers under the S. P . , " Saturdax_ Evening_ Post, 187:11-12, J anuary 7,
191.1.
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Paramount 1n Progressive philosophy Has be lief in the people and
their ability to use reason and good political judgment.

Hiram

Johnson r e flected this belief in his inaugural speech on January 4,
1911, \oJhen he said the "deep-rooted belief in popular government"
.res t ed in the peoples' "ability to govern.

ul6

Also fundamental · to progress ivism Has b e lief in the right of the
people to determine their des tiny .

Echoing this sentiment, ex-S ena tor

Albert J. Beveridge \Hote in Collier's Heekly:

"The Progressive party

stands for Thomas Jefferson's principle of the rule of the people; and,
therefore, for the policy of th e right of the people to pass on their
mm

la\-7S and public servants at any time th ey please. .

ul7

In addition to the positive right of people to govern themselves
was . the practical matter of establishing a democratic system of checks
and balances .

Theodore Roos evelt, California ' s Hiram Johnson, and

other Progressive l eaders wanted to create a permanent check on public
officials who ,.,ere at the time considered to be in the clutches of
big business .
politics.

The movement sought to divorce the corporation from

In Berkeley, Governor Johnson stated that th e purpose of the

initiative , referendum, and recall ,.,as to protect the pe ople "against
corporation greed, corporation control or political domination."l8
Recall and thE2. JudiciaJZY.·

Possibly mor e than any other factor,

disaffection \-lith the judicial branch vms the catalys t to recall.
Nationally, the Progressives were dismayed \-lith the way in ,.;rhich the
16Excerpted from the t ext of Johnson' s address , .§_acramento Bee ,
January L,, 1911.
17Albert J. Beveridge, "Hhat the Progress ive Party Stands For,"
Colliers Weekly, 52 : 7-8 , J anuary 31, 1914.
18Los Angel es Express , Octobe r 6, 1911 .
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courts interpreted social legislation.

Decisions in such famous cases

as Lochner v. Nmv ,Xork, 19 invalidating the New York ten-hour bakeshop
l a\.;r, and Adair v. United States, 20 declaring void the federal yellmvdog contract statute, strictly upheld the classic concept of laissez
faire.

Progressives throughout the country denounced the courts as

''tools of the trusts, stooges of entrenched corporate interests, enemies
of the \>10rking man and of the common social welfare. rr2l
Similarly, in California it \'las widespread distrust and dissaffection with the courts, more specifically the state supreme court,
which prompted strong support for the adoption of recall .

It was felt

the time had come to make the judicial branch more responsible .
According to the B~llot Arguments
\'las

Ei

1911 the specific purpo se of r ecall

to provide a check on the pmvers of the courts and thereby give the

people greater control over the judiciary . 22
Displeasure with the judicial b ranch in California stemmed from
several sources.

The greatest grievance against the courts was their

usurpation of t he legislative function.

This charge against the judi-

ciary had its origin in the case of Houghton v. Austin .

The Supreme

Court in 1874 had declared unconstitutional the acts of the legislature
of California providing for the collection of state taxes . 23
19Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45.
20Adair v . United States
- - , . 208 U. S. 161.
21As cited in Hinfred A. Harbison and Alfred H. Kelly. Th e American
Constitution: Its Origins and Deve lopment;_ (New York: H. H. Norton and
Company, I n c . , 1963), p. 628 .
22

Rallo~ Ar guments of 1911. Government Publications Department,
California State Library, Sacramento, California. Rare state election
document \'lhich is a one-page fold - out brochure .
23uought0l~ v . Austin, L•7 Cal. 6/f6.
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So strong were t he r epercu ssions of this decision it prompted
State Senator Lee Gates and Assemblyman William Clark to write 17
years late r:

"In truth, s o overshadm.;ring is the control of the judi-

ciary over legislation that it is almost a misnomer to speak of the
.

legislature as the lmv-making branch of the government ."

2L

f

It was also

charged on the Senate floor in 1911 tha t big business had influence d
the court ' s decision.25

This charge linked one of the most highly

re s pected branches of government with machine politics and vested
interests.

Both wer e anathema to Progressives .

It was argued by some in California that if the judicial branch
encroached upon l egislative powers it should also be subject to r ecall .
This concept

\ •Tas

presented to the el e ctorate in the Voters Handbook of

1911:
Titis power to r emove dishonest or inc apable servants is a
power which has not been greatly questioned except as relates
to th e judiciary . Hut judges , especially those of the Supreme
Court, by construing the acts of the legislature perform acts
of l egislation as truly as does the le gislature.26
The recall measure \vas first introduced for consideration into the
California Sena t e on January 20, 1911, by Senator Lee Gates of Los
Angeles.

It was then referred to the Senate judiciary committee for

consideration .

Once in the committee a heated debate ens ued over the

provis ion of judicial s us ceptibility to the recall.

No s ingl e aspect

of the initiative, referendum, and recall stirred more controversy than
24\.Jilliam C. Cl ark and Lee C. Gates . Pro_~ed Amendments to the
Cons titution _9f the State of California with Legislativ e Reasons for and
Aga ins t Adoption (October, 1 911) .
25 The charge wa s made by Charles S. \,TJ1ee1er.
February 4, 1911.
26M. Fay Coughlin .

Los Angeles Time~,

California Voters Handbook of 1911, p. 44.

15
provisions for recall of the judicial brancl1.

Nationally, Roosevelt

had spoken out for its adoption into the Progressive program of r eform .
President Taft \vas, hmvever , adamantly opposed to r eca ll of t he judiciary.

So unpalatable \vas recall of judges to him that h e held up

Arizona ' s statehood until the provision was removed from its Const itution.

Taft ' s sentiment was typical of the faction in California which

opposed r ecall of the judicial branch.

Such a posit ion was stated by

Taft in The Outlook:
. . . there could not be a system better adopted to deprive
the judiciary of that indep enden ce \vithout \vhich the lib erty
and other rights of the individual cannot be ma intained against
the government and th e majority.27
Generally the recurr ing theme of the opponents of judicial recall
\vas the need for an independent judiciary free from \vhimsical public
pressures.

This \<las echoed by the American Bar Association \vhich in

1911 adopted a r esolution condemning the r ecal l of judges and led an
active campaign against its adoption .
Locally, Hiram Johnson was adamant about recall of the judiciary .
He proclaimed that " so far as the r e call is concerned , did the solution
of the matter rest "~>lith me , I \.Jould app ly it to every official. u28
A typical reaction on the part of those opposed to judicial
recall is represented by A. F; Harrison in an essay read before the
Chi t Chat Club of San Francisco, July 10, 1911 .

Referring to recall

of the judicia ry he said:
To my mind the grea t es t danger i n this reform lies in the
f act th a t it is an ill-considered assault upon the most de licate
part of our government al machinery, and tends to destroy the

27As cited in The Outlook (Hay 23 , 1912), p . 604 .
28sacramento Bee, January

L,,

1911 .
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independence and courage of the judiciary, in whom the quality
of independence and fearlessness has been heretofore considered
of the most vi tal neces sity in protecting the Llberty and security of a free pe ople.29
~
The recall bill was introduced into the California legislature
where debate within t he Senate Judiciary Committee \vas not unlike
public reaction tmvard the measure .

The Senate conm1ittee represented

a microcosm of those opposed and those favoring recall.
Senator Wright led the dissenters in the main committee action
over the issue of excluding the j udges from . the recall bill.

The

first victory for recall came on February 17, \vhen by a vote of 10 to
3 the committee adopted the Gates recall amendment and moved it onto
the Senate f loor.
Once on the Senate floor , State Senators Wright and Wolfe immediately initiated the opposition .

Wright proposed an amendment \·Ihich

would delete from the Gates measure recall of the judiciary .

It was

defeated 29 to 11.
The debate of r ecall \vithin the Senate \vas heated and thorough,
but the bill was eventually adopted by a comfortab l e vote of 36 to
four.

The Cal ifornia Progessi ves had won round t\vo .
The Assemb ly opposition gave recall much the same treatment as

Senators Wright and Wolfe , even to the point of using identical arguments and stalling tactics .

Defeating the opposition, the Progressives

on }1arch 6 , maneuvered the amendment out of the Assembly Commit tee on
Direct Legislation with a recommendation that it be adopted .
After the measur e was out of committee, Assemblyman N. R. Jones of
Contra Costa County introduced a motion that would have exc luded
29t.. . F . Norrison, " The Recall of Judges, " (An essay read before the
Chit Chat Club of San Francisco, July 10, 1911) .
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justices of the State Supreme Court, justices of the District Court of
App eal, and Superior Court judges from recall.
Amendment was composed of

t~oJ"O

Support of the Jones

factions, those \llho opposed recall in any

form, and those Progressives tllho opposed recall of the judiciary .
After a day of vigorous debate, the Jones Amendment was defeated by
59 to 20. 30
Few l egisla tive measures have been given more consideration than
the recall amendment.

According to Franklin Hichborn, "Never before

. had a measure before the California Legislature been so thoroughly
studied and discussed . . . . "31

It seems likely that the issue s

involving the recall concept \vere completely aired .
was given full opportunity during the

P~ogres sive

The opposition

reform campaign to

respond and raise considerations they thought were important.
The sentiment in . the California State Legislature on the recall
amendment of 1911 \vas ovenoJ"helmingly in favor of its adoption.

One

hundred and six l egislators voted for the amendment and fourteen
against it .
Le~is lative

Intent and the Campaign of 1911.

On the eve of the

1906 election the Fresno Republican stated that . "The man to win will
be the man \vho makes his appeal direct . to the peop le . " 32

This \lias the

30I am indebted to Franklin Hichborn for the account of the recall
measure in its various l egis l ative s t ages . This discussion \-las based
upon his book, Story~ the ~3lifornia Legislature~ 1911 (S an
Fra ncisco : J ames H. Barry Company, 1911), pp . 123-138 .
31Hichborn, p. 137.
32The California state l egis lature does not publish its debate s ,
keep committee reports, or record legislative h earings . The absence
of such information makes the establishment of official meaning, more
commonly knmm as legislative inte nt, rather difficult .
The parti cular proble m of estab lishing intent with regard to recall
in California is espec i a lly difficult because its original enactment
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theme that four years later dominated the campaign of lliram Johnson
for the office of governor.
During the Johnson campaign of 1910 little was said of direct
legis lation and almost no mention was made of the recall.

Not until

the c lo se of the 1910 legislative sess ion did the governor begin his
campaign for initiative, referendum , and recall.33

In his inaugural

address J ohnson spelled out his stand on direct legislation and introduced certain themes which "'ere to remain consistent throughout public
debate by the proponents of re call during the l egis l at i ve reform campaign of 1911.

He proclaimed in the address that those who espoused

the meas ures of dir ect legi s lation and recall did so because of a
deep rooted belief in popular government and not only in
the right of the people to govern but in their ability to govern
. i f the people have the right, the ability and the intelligence to elect, they have , as 'vell, the right, ability and
intelligence to reject or to recall; and this applies v1ith equal
for ce to 'an administrative or a judicial officer .34

in 1911 'vas too early fo r the California's Legislat ive Service Conmlis sion
to have reported on. Contained in the Legislative Service Commission
are reports establishing legislative intent of specific measures.
Though difficult, es tablishment of intent is not entirely impossible.
Pollack's Fundamenta l s of Legal Research [En~ in H. Pollack, Fundamentals
~Legal Research, third edition (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1967), pp. 341-342] suggests several official as well as unofficial
sources by which official intent might properly be determined . These
sources include: texts, pamphlets, and periodicals containin g di scussion
of the bill before or af ter its enactment; newspapers covering the period
when the bill \vas under consideration and debate ; 'vhere it can be
established the state copied another bill; a nd genera l events that might
s he d light upon the bill ' s original meaning and its author ' s interpretation.
The attempt by this sec tion to estab lish official intent of the
1911 recall measure shall be guided by the principles as stated in
Pollack's text which is used in most major American schools of l aw .
33quoted in Mich ae l P. Rogin and John L. Shover. Po litic a l Change
in California: Critica l Elections and Social Movements, 1890-1966
(He st port: Greemvood Publishing CorporatiOl;-:-· 1969), p. 9-6-.- - - 34outlook, February 10, 1912 , p. 317 .
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The Sacramento llee responde d to Johnson ' s comments by

~"riting

tha t his inaugural message should be regarded as one of the "highest
tributes ever paid 'The People of California. '" 35

This was a very

popular theme and was not only characteristic of the California
Progress ives , but was typica l of the mood which permeated the na tion a l
Progressive movement.

It seems likely that Johnson and his fellm"

Progress ive s were perhaps t aking their cues from the national l eader s
such as Theodore Roosevelt.
The re has been some controversy as to the role Johnson played
in formulatin g hi s platform of direct legis lation .

EdHard Dickson,

one of Johnson ' s intima te politica l aides and a former newspape r editor,
believed that Johns on had little knmo1ledge or underst anding of the
recall measure until l a te in his 1910 campaign.36

In his address at

Blanchard Hall in Los Angeles, June 3, 1910, Johnson condemned the evils
of the political system and promised to put control of institutions
into the hands of the people, but he made no mention of r ecall . 37

Most

of his speeches during the 1910 campaign make no refe rence t o recall .
Johnson's inaugural address con tains his first public remarks on the
r ecall.
35 s acr amento Bee, January 4, 1911.
rntervie~., ~"ith Edward A. Di cks on by George Mowry , June 25, 19L,8,
as cited by Mmo1ry in The California Progressives (Berke l ey : University
of California Press , 1951), p. 135 .
36

37 Full t ext of the s peech can be found bound in volume 6 of California
Speeches (#13, p. 12) at the California State Library.
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In the October , 1914, issue of

~veryhody ' s

Magazine , Denver

polic e commissione r and controver s i a l prop ag3ndist, George Creel ,
suggested that J ohns on had only " glib familiarity \<li th the i nitia tive,
refe r e ndum, and r ecall. " 38
In r esponse to this scathing attack on the progr essive credentials of Johnson, Dr. J ohn R. Haynes r eplied that Johns on had spent
"days in as s isting in the drafting" of some of the mos t i mpor tan t
r e form mea sures.3 9

Haynes, a long with Johnson's aide, Edward Dickson,

are credited \<lith dr afting the democrat i zing amendments to t he s tate ·
cons titution.
It was Dr. Haynes who first introduce d to the United St ates
recall in its mode rn form by way of the Los Ange l es City Charter of
1903.

Haynes worked incessantly on reform proposal s for the cit y and,

subsequently, the sta te.
According to Bird and Ryan, Haynes had spent sever a l years
ob serving mismanagement and corruption in Philadelphia politics.

He

conclude d from his observations that the ''ord i na ry poli t ical panaceas
wer e of no avail, tha t the e lection of good men to offi ce was an
accomplishment only spasmodically achieved.

"40

It \<las from his

experiences in Philadelphia that led Haynes to search for meaningful
political reforms.
38ceor ge Cree l, "\.Jhat About Hiram Johnson ," Everybody ' s Hagaz ine ,
31:458 , Octobe r, 1914.
39sacrament o .!!.ee, Octob e r 10, 1941.
40

Bird and Ryan , p. 24 .
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There is no traceable evidence that the existence of recall in
Switzerland had any influence on its adoption in California.4 1

In fact ,

Haynes denied any kno,vledge of the SHiss model and held that he
received the idea from reading The _City for the People, by Frank
Parsons.42

The relevant passage which must have influenc ed Haynes,

and thus prompted him to draft California recall measures, deals \vi th
democracy and direct controls on the representative system:
What we want is not a body of legislators beyond the reach
of the people . . • , but a body of legislators subject at all
times to the peop l es ' direction and control . . . .
It is good to choose strong men to manage municipal and
state affairs, but it is well too to provide the means to hold
them in check or make them move at the peoples' \vill. . . .
The solution lies in a representative system guarded by constitutional provisions for popular initiative, adoption, veto, and
recall.43
From 1901 to 1911 Haynes lobbied fervently for concepts of direct
· democracy and direct legisla tion at every session of the California
l egislature . 44

There was no one in California more dedicated to

seeing principles of direct legislation, as proposed by the Progressives,
enacted into lmv than Haynes.
41It should be noted, however, that recall had been in existence
at the statewide level in Oregon since 1908. The Sacramento Bee on
January 4, 1911 reported that Johnson adopted the Oregon Plan. There
i s , however, little evidence to indica te that the Oregon r ecall had
any appreciable influence in California.
The recall in California developed from its mvn indigenous political s ituation and was au thored by men who evidently did not consult
the Oregon Plan at great l en gth.
42 cited in Hilliam E. Rappard, "The Initia tive , Referendum, and
Recall in S\vitzerland, " The Annals .2.!_ the American Academy of Politica l
and Social Science, 43:U0-145, September, 1912.
43 Frank Par sons . The ~l.J:y for the People (Philadelphia: C. F.
Taylor, 1901), p . 256.
4L1V. 0 . Key and \Huston Crouch . Initiative an<i_ _!(eferendum in
California (Berkeley: University of California, 1939), p . 425 .
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All evidence r .oints to Edward Dickson as being Haynes ' assistant

in drafting of the recall measure.

Dickson, who was once a prominent

political correspondent before becoming editor of the

~os

Ange]-es

Express, help ed launch the reformist Lincoln-Roo seve lt League in the
spring of 1907.

The league represented a movement in the Republican

party to cleanse California politics of Southern Pacific domination .
Dickson, according · to Geo,rge Mmvry, planted the whole idea of initiative, referendum, and recall in the Johnson program.

Apparently it

was initially Dickson ' s encouragement in the early part of 1910 that
prompted Johnson to include recall in the reformist campaign, and it
was mainly Haynes, Hho, 'vith Dickson:, drafted the actual recall
amendment.

Both claimed Johnson had a hand in the actual drafting

of the measure.45
Proponents of recall on the eve of the 1911 special election
argued that the purpose of recall 'vas to " introduce into public li fe
,.;rhat is indispensable in private and business life . . . . the poHer
to remove a dis honest , incap able , or unsatisfactory servant . "46· It
should be noted th at grounds for recall were left quite general and
not limited to definite l egal qualifications .
Senator Lee Gates, the author of the Senate recall amendment ,
suggested that the purpose of recall was to make the '' creator greater
45noth men came to Johnson' s defense following the appearance of
George Creel ' s article in Everyb~~ Magazine a tt acking Johnson and
inferring that h e was a phony Progressive . Haynes and Dickson made
statements to th e contrary as cited in the Sacramento Bee , October 10,
191L•.
46quoted from " Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the State
of California with Legislative Reasons for and Against Adoption,"
Octob er, 1911.
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than the creature" by "t aking hack the arbitrary pm\ler '"hich the
creature ha d arrogated to itself."47
The major reason given by the opponents of re call, other th an
objec tions over r ecall of judges , \\las the concern tha t tyranny 1\lould
prevail if the majori ty could control ac tions of elected offi cia l s .48
Thi s argument was ine f fec tu al in the f ace of gr and and e l oquent arguments for pu t tin g greater f ai th in the people.

It seemed that any

opposition ef fort to r ecall \\las innocuous when compared with the
Johnson machine tha t r ep la ced the incr easingly vulner ab l e Southern
Pacific .
The peop le of California responded affirmatively to t he Progr essive
r e form measures.

Hiram Johnson's campaign efforts h ad been vigorous

and \\lell execut ed with f e\\1 serious impediments,

Needless to say ,

recal l enjoyed a public, statewide forum '"here its intent and consequences could be thoroughly considered .
Calif or nia agr eed to r eform its government and the people ovenvhelm-ingly endorsed the recall amendment . 49
Recall as a Panacea.
book

Int~_rven tion

Professor Richard Barne t, writing in hi s

an<.!_ Revolution , state s that " every revolutionary

movement i s bas ed upon the myth tha t the r emoval of a man . . . . is
all that s tands in the \vay of progress and justice . rr50
47cited by Franklin Hichborn.
1911, p. 131.

This i s a

Story of California Legisl ature o f

48uichborn, p . 131 .
49

.
The fin al s tatewide vote was 178,115 f or recall and 53 ,755
against it.
50Rich ard Barne t. Interven tion and Revolution (New York: Horld
Publis hing Company, 1968), p. 38.

poignant expression of the mood whicl1 permeated the people of California
in the early twentieth century.

The Progress ives had turned reform of

social and political institutions into a moralistic, religious crusade .
It became a crusade to end injustice and corruption forever.
Inherent in fervently zealous crusades is often the tendency to
over-simplify the problem and thereby overestimate the solution.

The

r eliance upon a cure-all is in itself an examp l e of over-simplistic
behavior .

Progressive reformism was based upon the political myth

of direct democracy.

Initiative, referendum, and recall r epresented

the panaceas to prevailing social ills .
Progressives led their follm\7ers to the belief that popular rule
\\70uld correct the corrupti on, stop the inequities, expose the abuses,
and marshall the forces of good in soci e ty .

This sense of finalty

was expressed by Johnson's aide upon hearing of the l egislature ' s adoption of r ecall .

He exclaimed ,

11

gov~rnment

Popul ar

last positively and permanently established. 11 51

in California is at

Such inf ectious expres·-

sions of hop e and optimism were typical.
William Allen

l~hite

'"rote that

11

•

•

•

when the people knm\7 ,.,here

to strike at an evil , they a h\7ays hit it. 11 52

For Progressives the evil

was represented, in part, by elected officials \\Tho '"ere self-serving
and who be tr ayed public trust.

The s olution \\las in controlling the

scoundr els , thereby preventing the degeneration of society .
5lquoted in Los Angeles Express, March 8, 1911 .
5 2lvilliam Allen Hhi te. The Old _9rder Change th (Nevl York : The
MacMi llan Co . , 1910), p. 47.
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In proposing recall as a panacea the Progressives ackumo1ledged
one of the oldest political checks on pmo1er lmm·m to man, the people .
Primacy and asccndency of the people characterized Ute period of
Progressive reformism in California and throughout the nation .

l
I

CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL

LA~~

OF RECALL FOR CITIES
Pursuant to the 1911 cons titutional amendment providing for the
recall of elective public officers, the California legis lature passed
acts to provide for direct l egislation, including recall, by electors
in the counties and cities throughout the state.
Article 23, section 13, of the constitution gives the legislature
authority to establish recall procedures for cities , and the establishment of such provisions by legislative enactment is the general law
governing the State of California and its various political s ubdivisions .
Para graph 14 of Article 23 excludes from the general laH provisions
cities \'lith charters establishing their own procedures for recall.
This chapter will r ender a general treatment of the substantive
statutory deve lopments governing the general l aw of recall.

The pro-

vis ions chosen for analysis are those \'lhich have influenced the n a ture
of the law vis-a-vis its original provisions .

I.

CO~ffiN CEMENT

OF RECALL PROCEEDINGS

In 1911 m1d er the original municipal recall provisions no public
officia l could be recalled until he held his office for a t l eas t four
months . 1

Und er the 1911 s t atute this \'las the only s tipulation for the

l s t atutes of Califo:r.nia, 1911, Ch . 185, p. 359 .
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recall of any holder of any elective municipal office .

This was

changed, however, in 1931 to require tha t (1) th e official sought to
be recalled must have held his office a t least six month s , and (2) no
recall pe tition could be fil ed against an officer within a six month
period of the last filing of s uch pe tition. 2

This version of the

six-month provision first appeared in 1931--the 1911 l aw provided no
such r equirement.

Changes ,.,ere made in the wording of the la,., during

the legislative sessions of 1939, 1959, and 1961, but the provision
has r emaine d unchanged in its meaning.

No specific intent can be

found for the provi s ion.
It can be assumed that the intent of the legislature was to ext end
the public official's period of grace in which time he could more
properly prove himself .

It also seems apparent that the ne'" provis ion

was des igned to discourage repeated nuis ance r ecall attempts by a llowing
the official to e njoy a longe r period in which h e 'wuld be immune from
external distractions, such as repeat ed recall attempts . 3
Ne,., provis ions to the l a,., in 1931 provided that recall proceedings
could only take place after a notice of inten tion had been filed and
publis hed in the loc al ne1o~spaper. 4

Apparently the purpose of this pro-

vision was to provide for a greater dis semination of information concerning the issues surrounding the recall atte mpt and to alert the
electorate as to the nature of the petition to be circula ted .
2sta ts., 19 31 , Ch. 27LI, p. 563, Sec . 1.
3The County a nd City Clerks Association h as apparently played a
prominent ro l e in re form l egi s l a ti on of the recall . This fact will
be brou gh t out more clearly l a t er in the chapter .
4stats., 19 l~. Ch. 274, pp. 563-564, Sec . 2.
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Need for a more informe d public regarding the issues of re call
elec tions had a lways been one of the demands of those in favo r of
reforming the l aw.

From its early beginning , recall unden.rent consi-

de r able abuse with r egard to the ci r cula tion of petitions and fra udul ent allega tions about the cont ents and na ture of the petitions .
One of the mos t notorious cases of abuse, for example , Has in
the Gran t recall elect i on in San Francisco where investigations have
disclosed tha t s i gnatures acquired on Grant ' s r ecall petitions were
achieved by mis representin g the nature of the petition in order to
induce reluctant citizens to sign . 5
Outraged by the abuse of recall and misconduct of its proponents ,
State Senator Chandler during th e 1915 legislative sess ion introduced
a bill6 Hhich r equired that at the top of each r e call peti t ion must be
printed a title describing the nature of the petition and t he name of
the officer sought to be r e called.

This provision became l aw and Has

inc luded in the 1915 statute s as an amendment to the Po liti cal Codes
relating to all initiative, r eferendum, and r e call petitions. 7
Chandler a lso introduced l egisla tion 8 making it a f e l ony for
anyone to use a fict i tious name on any recall petit i on , or to subscrib e the name of another .

The penalty for t his felony was imp rison-

ment in the s t a te prison for not less than one , nor more than fourteen
years.9
5Franklin Hichborn , Richboro ' s Legislative Bul l e tin (January 20 ,
1915)' p . 3 .
6senate Bill No. 725 .
7S t? t s.. , 1915 , Ch . 4 2 , p . 50 , Sec . 2 .
Bs enate Hill No . 725 .
9 sta t s . , 1911_, Ch. 43, p . 51 , Sec. 1.
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It is interes ting to note that not one vote \\la s c as t agains t any
of Chandler ' s r e form measures . lO

Apparently a strong feeling existed

s oon after re call ' s i nception tha t it was in gr ea t need of r ef orm a nd
f urther improvement .
Bird and Ry an r eport that as l a te as 1930 solicitors '"ere often
guilty of misrepresent a tion and tha t due to f ees of 10 cents per name
\•Jhich Here pa id by r ecal l organizers , " few names '"e r e acquired in a
spirit of good faith and s ince rity ."!!
In the 1931 amendments the notice of intention had to consist
of a s t atement not in excess of five hundr ed words givin g the reasons
for t he recall.

If t he city did not have a ne\\lspaper of general cir-

culation then the statement was required to be po sted in three public
places .
The statute also required that one copy of the notice be sent to
the officer sought to be recal l e d and that one be filed with th e city
clerk .
Th ese provisions have r emained to the present .

Hm\lever, while the

1931 cod es did not provide tha t the ide nt i ty of the proponents ne cessarily b e disclosed, the 1961 amendments to the codes did make s uch a
requirement t ha t at l eas t one proponent must be identified by name and
address . 1 2

In 1969 this \\las amended so that while one proponen t must

lOrhe informa ti on r egarding the introduc tion of r eform l egi s l ation
by Sen ator Chandler is taken f rom Franklin Hichborn, _S tory £!_ the
California Leg i s_!_atur e of 1915 (San Francis co: J a mes H. Barry Company ,
1915), pp . 103-106.

I

I

11Frede ri ck Bird and Francis Rya~ , The Reca ll of Public Offi cers :
Jl Studx_ of the Qperatio~~- of the Reca~_l.!..~ caiilor;ia· (Ne\\1 York: Th e
Macl'1i1lan Company , 1 930) , p . 22 .
1 2st nts . , 1961, Ch . 23, Div. 14, (Ch . 3) , p. 865.
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identify himself, not more than five names and addresse8 could appear
on the notice. 13
The 1931 statutes allmved fourteen days after publication or posting
of intent in which the officer sought to be recalled could himself
utilize similar procedures to offer a response to the charges in a
statement not exceeding 500

~vords .

The period of time

~vi thin

which the

official could answer charges was narrov1ed to seven days in 1957. 1 4
According to the 1931 recall lmv, tHenty-one days from the publication or posting of the notice and statement the petition could be
circulated for the purpose of gathering signatures.

This was also

changed in 1957 to seven days after publication,l5 thus narrowing the
Haiting time for the proponents by two-thirds as compared to the 1931

The 19 61 statutes provided that the proponents of a reca l l must
publish at least once in a newspaper of general circulation copies of
the notice, statement, and answer or else post the same in three public
places .l6

The newspaper notice is not posted at the expense of the

incumbent, but is include d in the official legal notices colmm1 which
most papers run regularly .
The lmv was simply clarified in the changes from 1931 to 1969
regarding the commencement of recall proceedings.
of the changes

~.Jas

to more clearly define sp ec ial time periods for

various s tages in the over-all r ecall procedure.
13stats., 1969, Ch . 774' p . 1552 .
14stats.,

19~,

Ch. 1316, PP· 2637-2638 .

l5stat_§_., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638 .
16stats . ,

196~,

The appar ent intent

Ch . 23, Div. (Ch . 3) ' p. 866 .

However, by doing so ,
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the overall effect was to shorten the running time for the proponents,
thereby making recall somewhat more difficult.
As previously mentioned, the legislature has shown considerable
concern that the issues of a recall attempt be made public and full
information regarding the recall be available prior to the circulation
of any petition.
The 1931, 1939, 1957, and 1961 changes have consistently shown an
interest toward making the election laws more specific and

~ess

am-

biguous procedurally.
II.

SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT

The language of the 1911 recall law for municipalities provided
that 25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding general municipal
election be the required amount of signatures on a petition. 1 7
This particular provision was poorly worded and left the law
vague as to its true meaning.

The provision could have been construed

to mean that twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast within the
city, rather than the vote cast for the specific office from which
the officer was sought to be recalled.
Proper clarification of this statute exists in the State Constitution where it requires that until otherwise provided by law no city
could require a recall petition to be signed by "electors more in
number than 25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election
for all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to be
removed occupies.rrl8
17stats., 1911, Ch. 185, pp. 359-360, Sec. 10.
18see the California State Constitution, Article XXIII, Sec. 14.
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It is inconceivable that the 1911 act providing for recall of
municipal corporations would have a different percentage requirement
for the recall petition than the requirement in the constitutional
amendment of the same year .
It is significant to note that this is the only provision which
the constitution specifically makes for general law cities.

It is

also not eworthy that the signature requirement for elective public
officers of the state is 12%-13% less than for municipal offices.
It has been suggested that the criteria for higher signature requirements for recall from non-statewide offices was the fear that local
officers would be subjected to a greater number of recall attempts
because relatively few signatures would be required in sparsely populated areas to satisfy more lenient state-wide requirements. 1 9
Apparently the drafters of the constitutional amendment providing
for recall had enough insight into the patterns of local recall behavior
to make the distinction between municipal and statewide elections a
substantive part of the constitutional provision.

The opportunity

for making such observations was available in those cities prior to
1911 which incorpora ted recall into their election procedures.

Accord-

ing to Bird and Ryan, between the introduction of recall in the 1903
Los Angeles City Charter and the enactment of the State Law of 1911, 25
out of the 31 cities 2 0 under freeholder charters adopted recall procedures. 21
19Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, California Constitution
Revis ion Commission (San Francisco , California, 1968), p. 21.
20Home rule cities that did not adopt r ecall during this period were :
Grass Valley, Napa, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Rosa, and Wats onville.
2lBird and Ryan, p. 58.
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The widespread popularity of recall in cities prior to its statewide acceptance in 1911 was due, in part, to the successful outcome of
the 1904 Davenport recall held in Los Angeles.

The removal of the city's

mayor by recall methods employed in the 1903 Los Angeles charter was
hailed with general satisfaction throughout the state.22
Another reason has been given for the considerable difference
in signature requirements for state and city officials .

Apparently,

in spite of the reformist Progressive zeal in the early 20th century,
recall attempts for trivial reasons were frowned upon by most of the
people .

It \-Tas recognized, state Bird and Ryan, that "recall was to

be invoked only in extreme cases"--as a last resort.23

It was felt that

any recall movement had to be supported by a sizable body of responsible
citizens in order for recall to be successful .
Not all were satisfied with the recall operation.

An attack was

launched by the 1917 legislature against recall, composed of those
responding to its abuses as well as those who were probably just antagonistic to the concept of recall itself.
Assemblyman Friedman, from San Francisco, proposed a constitutional amendment24 which would have allowed for counter-petitions in
the event of a recall attempt.

If , for example, a recall petition was

certified as sufficient, Friedman's bill would have allowed a counterpetition signed by 10% of the electors to nullify the original petition
by the proponents, thus blocking the recall election . 25
22Bird and Ryan, p. 230 .
23Bird and Ryan, p. 231.
24Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 78.
25Franklin Hichborn, ·Hichborn's Legislative Bulletin (March 17,
1917), p . 1.

34
TABLE I
EVALUATION OF THE SIGNATURE REQUIRE~ffiNT
ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL LAW OF RECALL FOR CITIES

Date
----

Percentage

1911

25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding
general municipal election**

1931

25% entire number of votes cast for the office which the
incumbent sought to be removed occupies at the last
preceding regular municipal election*

1933

25% of the entire number of votes cast for all candidates
for the office held by the incumbent at the last preceding
regular municipal election

1939

Same

1953

12% of the voters of the city

1957

25% of the voters of the city

1961

25% of the voters of the city on the day the petition
is filed

1 969

25% of the voters of the city according to the county
clerk's last official repor t of registration to the
Secretary of State

**The language of the Statute providing for municipal recal l was
unclear as to its intent . As stated it appears to require 25% of all
votes cast for all elective offices in the last preceding municipal
election . This provision is in conflict with section 14 of Article
XXIII which states that the general law for cities and counties shall
never exceed 25 % "of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election for all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to
be removed occupies." The wording in the general law was evidently
an oversight on the part of the drafters of the legislation proposing
t he statute.
*Here the language and meaning was brought in accordance with
the constitutional stipulation.
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TABLE I I
BREAKDOWN OF RECALL PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENT I NTO
NUMERICAL UNITS FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES

Number of
Regis t ered
Vot ers

Dates

Percentage of
Signature
Requirements

Based on
100,000

Based on

No. Si gnatur e
;Required
on Petition

*30% voting
of 100,000
registered
to vote .
19111935

25% entire
vote cast for
office which
incumbent
sough t to be
r emoved occupies at last
preceding
r egular muni cupal election .

7 , 500

19531957

12% of the
vot er s of the
city .

12,000

19571971

25% registered
voters of the
city.

Increas e
4,500
25,000
Incr ease
13,000

*Though the 30% figure is somewhat arbitrary, it is based upon the median voting turnout in non-partisan American cities as
reported by Robe rt Alford and Eugene Lee in " Voting Turnout in
American Cities," American Politica l Science Review, Vol. .62 .,
September , 1968, p . 796.
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The effect of such a measure would have rendered the recall
provision virtually inoperative.

While the measure did not pass

the assembly, it is perhaps significant of mounting displeasure, as
well as the recall opponent's ability to rally over some aspects of
the recalL

The measure was approved by the Assembly Committee on

Constitutiona.l Amendments. 26
The 1931 amendment to the Political Codes clarified the poorly
worded 1911 lalv providing for the signature requirement and brought
the general law in accord with the proper constitutional construction.
In order to avoid further possibility for misunderstanding--so
it seems, anyway--the wording in the 1931 statute relating to the
signature requirement for petitions was almost identical to the
Constitution:
• which petition shall be signed by qualified voters
equal in number to at least twenty-five per cent of the entire
number of votes cast for the office which the incumbent sought
to be removed occupies, at the last preceding regular municipal election at which such office was filled by election.27
The State Constitution reads:
• • • shall not require any such recall petition to be
signed by electors more in number than twenty-five per cent
of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election for
all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to
be removed occupies.28

26Hichborn,. p. 1.
27stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 563, Sec. 2.
28caiifornia State Constitution, Article XXIII, Sec. 14.

we

s~gnature

requirement remained at the original 25 per

cent level until 1953.

In 1953 the general law was changed to read

"not less than 12 per cent of the voters of the city.rr29
It was Assemblyman William C. Berry who authored the bill
which led to the 1953 change in the petition requirement.
Theoretically, the 1953 requirement made recall more difficult to
achieve by an increased signature requirement for recall petitions.30
While it appears that the 12 per cent provision should have
tempered recall attempts, this was apparently not the case.

Former

chairman of the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee,
Charles Conrad, reports that in 1956 and 1957 he was beseiged by
county and city clerks requesting to have the signature requirement
raised from 12 per cent of the registered voters to 25 per cent of
the registered voters.

They claimed that recall attempts had

gotten out of hand and had become a de finite nuisance r ather than
a responsible exercise in the democratic process.32
During the period when the 12 per cent signature requirement
was in effect, recall became a nuisance in a California city where
political factionalism is uncommonly extreme.

While the city,

Seas ide, is a rare case, it serves as an example for those critical
of the 12 per cent provision.

29stats., 1953, Ch. 1658, p. 3386, Sec. 1.
30see Chart B.
31Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee. "Voting Turnout in
American Cities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62,
September , 1968, p. 799.
32rnterview with Assemblyman Charles J. Conrad (R-56th
District), June 30, 1971.
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The city attorney of Seaside, Saul Weingarten, reported that
the 12 percent requirement did not create a responsible framework
for recall.

He cites examples of nuisance "out" factions who were

numerous enough to obtain the required 12 percent on the petition,
yet lacked considerably the 51 percent needed to carry a recall
election.

It was the policy of these groups to hinder and harass the

city council by seeking recall elections as often as possible until
they received favored treatment or gained control of municipal government.33
The above illustration, though not a typical example, points to
a legitimate criticism against general law signature requirements for
recall petitions.

For example, the 12 percent provision which was the

general law from 1953 to 1957 was politically acceptable and made
poor law.

The 12 percent requirement enabled recall to be initiated

too easily giving no substantive indication that it could actually be
achieved.
The 1957 l egislature amended the election code to provide that a
petition demanding the recall of an official " shall be signed by not
less than 25 percent of the voters of the city.34
As previously mentioned, Assemblyman Charles Conrad was pressed
by county and city clerk's associations to have the signature requirement changed from 12 percent to 25 percent in order that recall would
33saul M. Weingarten, "Recall Elections in General Law Cities: A
Consideration of Some Problems Rais ed by Recall Procedures." Paper
delivered to City Attorney's Department, League of California Cities,
1956, proce edings, p. 3.
34

.
Stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2637.

39

become a more "sincere endeavor."35

Conrad believes that it was an

incident in Seaside which prompted the campaign to have recall harder
to achieve.

The incident, according to Conrad, was one in which pro-

ponents of a recall were in the streets gathering signatures and
making a "nuisance" of themselves only a few days after a recall
election had failed.

This does not seem likely--or. at least it was

not a substantial political threat (admittedly a nuisance) for the
law did not allow recall proceedings to take place until six months
after filing of the last petition.36
The 1957 la\-7 made the signature requirement considerably more
stringent--by 13 percent--than the 1953 requirement.

This represented

a drastic turn in the law because of the increased difficulty in
obtaining a validated petition.
Conrad's amendment to the 1953 signature requirement did not
represent a reversion to the original general law.

Rather, the new

25 percent provision was based upon 25 percent of the voters of the
city, while the original 25 percent was based upon votes cast for the
office at the last election.
The 1957 law has remained basically unchanged.

In 1961, the law

was clarified narrowing down the definition of the electoral body
upon which the 25 percent was based.

The law read " • • • 25 per cent

of the voters of the city on the day the petition is filed."37

In 1969

35Interview with Charles J. Conrad, June 30, 1971.
36rnterview by Dr. J. B. Briscoe with Mr. Saul Weingarten, former
City Attorney of Seaside, March 17, 1971. Weingarten alleged that in
Seaside, the loser of a recall election threatened to bankrupt the city
by circulating petitions until the continued cost of elections would
exhaust its funds.
37stats., 1961, Ch. 23, Div. 14 (Ch. 3), p. 864.
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it was amended to read, 25 percent of the voters of the city "according
to the county c l erk ' s last official report of registration to the
Secretary of State. "38
III.

CIRCULATION OF THE RECALL PETITION

Neither the State Constitution nor the 1911 municipal election
law made any provision for setting a specified time limit in which
signat~res

had to be gathered.

The law in both cases was silent on

the matter.
In 1931, however, a provision was added to the general l aw which
provided that the proponents of recall had sixty days from the first
date of publication or posting of the notice of intention before their
petitions were required to be filed.39
This did not mean tha t there tvas a sixty-day period in which to
gather signatures .

Rather, it was actually thirty-nine days because

of a prior passage which stated :

"After the expiration of t"tventy-one

days after the publication or posting of the notice and statement •• •
the petitions . • • may be circulated .

n40

Thus, for t•venty-one

days within the sixty day period the proponents were unable to gather
signatures.
In 1957 an amendment was added to the above s e ction clarifying
it somewhat and making the law easier to understand.

The new amend-

ment provided that the recall petition could be circulated and signed
38stats., 1969, Ch. 940, Sec . 18, p. 1882 .
39stats ., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 564.
40stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 564.
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seven days after the initial publication or posting of the notice,
statement and answer .

The officer sought to be recalled had 7 days

after being notified of the intention of recall, to file an answer
to the charges.41
These new provisions theoretically added seven days to the 1931
provision.

Thus, while the 1939 la\v provided for thirty-nine days,

the 1957 provision allowed forty-six days in which proponents could
gather signatures.

For the large municipalities the task of gathering

the requisite number of
possible feat.

signatu~es

in the time required seems an im-

A wide variance exists in the general law on this

point compared with such home-rule cities as Stockton, for example ,
which does not have a clear-cut deadline for termination, or Palo Alto,
which allows ninety days from the filing of the notice of intention.
An additional provision was added in 1967 stipulating that the
petition would become void for all purposes if it was not filed within
the time permitted by law.42

IV.

BALLOT AND NOMINEES

The 1911 municipal law on recall elections provided that electors
could vote first, on the issue of the recall itself by placing an X
after the words "yes" or "no".

If the elector wished the officer

recalled , and so designated on his ballot by the X (as required by
the statute), he then would vote for one of the candidates whose
name appeared on the ballot and who would assume the office vacated
4lstats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638.
42 Stats., 1967, Ch. 1148, p. 2828.
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for the remainder of the regular term, should the recall take
place.43
The 1931 Amendments to the statutes changed this portion of recall
law substantially.

The procedure for designating whether an officer

ought to be recalled remained the same .

The following section, however,

read:
If the recall prevails shall the council fill the vacancy
or vacancies by appointment or call a special election for that
purpose? Following the question shall be the words ' By appointment' and 'By special election ' on separate lines , with a blank
space at the right of each in which the elector shall indicate
by stamping a cross (X), his vote for appointment or election.44
If the recall prevailed and a majority favored the special election,
it would be held not less than thirty-five nor more than forty days
after the date of the order.

If, however, the special election pro-

cedure was not voted in, then the council would forthwith fill the
vacancy or vacancies by special appointment.
Under the 1931 l aw, if electors desired a more direct say in
government and thereby voted to have a special election for the filling
of a vacancy, then (1) an additional election was required--adding to
the inconvenience of the voters and stronger susceptibility to voter
apathy; and (2) such an election would add a discouraging extra cost
to the city and tax payers.
Theprincipleof two elections, one to determine the actual recall
and the second to elect a successor, if the electorate so desired,
was not new to the 1931 legislature who made the two-election principle
part of the general l aw .

The concept was first introduced into the

43stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 361.
44stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 566.
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1915 legislature in the form of Senate Constitutional Amendment No.
21.

Like the 1931 statute, the proposed amendment provided that in

recall, two elections would be held rather than one.
tion would determine the matter of the recall itself.

The first elecIf the incumbent

was recalled, a second election would determine the successor .45
Dr. Haynes and his associates objected strongly to the bill,
contending that the direct legislation measures were not in need of
change, rather greater enforcement of the law was needed in

0~der

to

prevent abuse.46
Haynes suggested that the legislature should alter the constitutional provision, defining more clearly the crimes of abuse and making
penalties for such abuse more stringent.47
Haynes was evidently convincing for the Senate Constitutional
Amendment No. 21 failed to get beyond committee consideration.

It

was, however, passed in statute form in 1931 and made part of the
general election la\v for cities.
When the election l aws \v-ere codified, for the first time, in 1939,
the section relating to the "two elections" principle was amended to
provide for the identical procedure as required in 1911--a single
recall election, where official is recalled and nominee is elected.
One difference in the law from the original 1911 provision was
the clarification that "if a majority or exactly half of those voting
on the question of the recall of any incumbent from office vote 'No',
45Franklin Hichborn, Story of the California Legislature of 1915,
pp. 103-106.
46Hichborn, pp. 103-106.
47Hichborn, pp. 103-106.
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the incumbent shall continue in office."48

This one election concept

has remained unchanged to the present.
V.

SUFFICIENCY AND VALIDITY OF CHARGES

It was not merely corruption that prompted the movement for
recall; rather the major catalyst was a desire to put political matters
in the hands of the people rather than the courts and legislature.
This sentiment is reflected in the 1911 law regarding the sufficiency
of form or substance in the statement on the grounds for recall:

"Any

insufficiency of form or substance in such statement shall in no wise
affect the validity of the election and proceedings held thereunder."49
The revised passage in the 1961 statqtes covering the same section
reads:

"The statement and answer are intended solely for the informa-

tion of the voters and no sufficiency in the form or substance thereof
shall affect the validity of the election or proceedings."50
The provision regarding the nature and validity of grounds for
recall has consistently r emained in a liberal, nonrestrictive form and
has not been redirected from its original intent.
The theoretical latitude of the law has consistently been a major
point of contention in the continuing dispute over recall.

In 1911

the main criticism expressed by the opponents of recall, other than
the issue of damaging the judiciary, was the absence of specific
grounds for recall.

It was felt by those who led the fight against

48stats., 1939, Ch. 26, Div. 13 (Ch. 3), p. 30 .
49stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p . 360 .
50stats., 1961, Ch. 23, p. 866.
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recall in 1911 that it was a dangerous and radical tool which lacked
specific charges of misconduct, malfeasance , or corruption.Sl
Bird and Ryan report that criticism against the "inadequate
and meaningless" charges often used in recall petitions prompted a
growing sentiment tha t charges should be made more specific and substantial. 52
The current debate on this matter is similar in nature, emphasizing
the need for specifically defined charges as grounds for recall in the
hope that this would make recall a more "res ponsible" procedure.

A

strong proponent for incorporating specific charges of misfeasance,
malfeasance, and non-feasance in recall law is Assemblyman James Hayes
from Long Beach.

Hayes contends that the section on recall was the

most crudely drawn part of the state constitution and should be revised.S3
One is impressed with the notion that the framers of the recall
amendment had intended that grounds for recall be left open for liberal
construction.

The constitutional version of this section reads:

Such petition shall contain a gene ral s tatement of the
grounds on which the r emoval is sought, which s tatement is
intended solely for the information of the electors and the
sufficiency of which shall not be open to review.54
The las t six words of the above passage are the key to a
proper unders tanding of the original intent.

Recall was originally

enacted primarily out of displeasure over the judiciary .

Progressives

51Ballot Argument for a nd Against Recall, October, 1911 (On file in
the Cal ifornia State Library, Documents and Government Publication) .
52Bird and Ryan, p . 325 .
53Inte rview with Assemblyman J ames Hayes, January 19, 1971.
54california State Constitution, Amendment 23, Sec . 2.
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hoped that the threat of r ecall would exercise some control over its
actions which had, prior to 1911, been considered highly improper and
beyond bounds of judicial discretion and restraint.

The progressives

and fellow reformers believed that the validity and sufficiency of
grounds for recall should be left to the people and not open to review
by the courts.

In order that court battles not develop over this

area of recall, the grounds and sufficiency of charges against an
official were to be political, as the revised Michigan constitution
so eloquently states,55 rather than of a judicial nature.
It has also been suggested that the prohibition against judicial
review expedites action on the petition without the delay that court
involvement would necessarily cause.56
The liberal nature of this section also points to an inherent
distrust of government on the part of the reform-minded Progressives
who introduced the recall concept into California government .

A con-

sequence of this distrust of government was a rekindled faith in the
judgment and ability of the people.

Thus, the question of the grounds

for recall was left solely in the hands of the people who were the
supreme and final judges.
VI.

SUBMISSION TO LEGISLATIVE BODY;
ORDER FOR SPECIAL ELECTION

The original 1911 provisions for municipal r ecall stipul ated
that upon determining sufficiency of the petition, the clerk must
55The revised ~lichigan Constitution , Article II, Sec . 8, states:
"The sufficiency of any statement of reasons or grounds procedurely
required shall b e a political rathe r than a judicial question."
Cited in the State of Michigan Manual (1963-1964), p. 36.
56Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, California Constitutional
Revision Commission , May, 1968, pp. 18-19.
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submit it to the government body without delay.

The government body

was to call a special election for the purpose of recall within not
less than thirty-five nor more than forty days a fter the date for
calling the election.

However, if a general municipal election was

to occur within sixty days, the city council, for example, could in
its discretion pos tpone the special r ecall election to the general
election or any general election occuring less than thirty-five days
after the order for the recall to be held.S7
The law was amended s ubst antially in 1957 to provide that the
municipal legis lative body order the special recall election to occur
not less than sixty nor more than seventy-five days after the date
of the initial order.

Also included in the amendment was the pro-

vision that the legislative body could have the recall election held
on the day of the regular municipal election if it was to fall within
not more than ninety and no l ess than s i x ty days from the date of the
order .58
The amendment of 1957 increased the discretionary powers of the
municipal governing body by giving them a newly expanded time limit
in which they had to call the special election and an increased time
period in which a general election might occur, in which case the
recall could then be deferred.
The section was again amended in 1970 ext e nding the period in
which the l egislative council of a city was required to call a spec ial
recall elec tion to no l ess than seventy-four nor more than eightynine days after the date of the order.
57stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 360.
58stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638.
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If the regular election is scheduled not more than 104 nor less

than seventy-four days from the date of the order, then the body has
the discretion to defer the recall until the regular election.59
This amendment extended by fourteen days the beginning and ending of
periods for conduct of a special election or consolidation with a
regular election.
The 1970 amendment remains in the spirit of the 1957 amendment
in that it gives more discretionary power to municipal legislative
bodies than the original law had provided.

Pressure from city regis-

trars and clerks was the major catalyst for the procedure changes .
State Senator Whetmore who introduced Senate Bill 1421 calling
for the election reform stated that city registrar's and clerks complained that they needed more time for the performance of clerical
duties.60
The purpose of this r e cent change in the gene ral election law was
to make election procedures more efficient, less costly, and give
more time to city officials in the execution of their administrative
functions.

This action was prompted by the 1970 June primary "fiasco"

where many voters in the Los Angeles area and throughout the state
failed to receive their sample ballots,61 Whetmore's legislation
was not aimed specifically at recall, but to elections in general
whereby cities were accorded ten additional days of discretion in
59stats., 1970, Ch. 615, p. 1218.
60rnformation gathered from an inte rview with Blanche Flanner,
·administrative assistant to Senator Whetmore, June 30, 1971.
6lrnterview with Blanche Flanner , June 30, 1971.
\
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calling special elections.

The intent of the bill was nothing more

than a hope for more efficient, effective, and economical procedures.
Some obse rva tions are essential to properly understand why such
discretionary power to municipal governing bodies can be a substantial
issue and may represent an alteration of original intent.

Just as

grounds for recall were not to be judged by a court, so t oo , perhaps,
such discretion of when an election is to be held--especially i f it
favors those sought to be recalled--was not meant to be given

LO

a

municipal governing body.
Municipal recall attempts usually involve members of city councils.
These same "municipal legislative bodies" have been given increased
discretionary authority to postpone an election that might appear
inimical to the councils' best interests or a council member's interest.
Implied in such a situation is an obvious conflict of interest.
Postponement of a special election might very well be in the
best interes t of the officer whose recall is sought.

He could count

on the extension of time to erase memories of the charges and launch
an all-out public relations campaign to rectify his image.

He would

have a dis tinct advantage in his access to the media and other public
relations channels due to his position as office holder and public
servant.
Recall movements are generally not tightly or well organized and
tend to dissipate through time.

Most proponents of recall are average

citizens with jobs and responsibili ties that must be given their
greatest attention.

Having to extend their recall campaign for sev-

eral more weeks i n order to keep pace with the public relations campaign
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of the person sought to be recalled would work an unfair bias and
hardship upon common proponents of recall.
In cases of recall

~-lith

a member of their body, councils and

boards of trustees often are in sympathy with the member sought to
be recalled and will stall by the use of various legal t actics in
order to subvert recall proceedings.
Ample opportunity exists for councils to delay or obstruct recall
proceedings in desperate bids for either more time or dismissal of
the charges.

Bird and Ryan point out that in the early days following

the passage of recall many attempts were terminated by litigation.62
They suggested that the means by which recall could be thwarted was
· SO

easy that anyone not taking advantage of them was simply ignorant

of the history of recall procedures.
While the legislature has taken note of recall abuses by the
"out" factions, it has taken little note of abuses by municipal political elites which hold greater leverage and have more effective
resources at their disposal.

The trend--though perhaps not aimed at

recall elections per se-- added dis cretionary powers for the calling
of special elections by city councils,does not fit the spirit of recall's
original intent.

It does, however, reflect the needs and demands of

a political system whose complexities have virtually required the
primacy of efficiency.

Original intent, it seems, has been sacri-

ficed for the current pressures of thrift and effectiveness--qualities
essential to contemporary democratic politics.
62Bird ·and Ryan, p. 313.

CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENT OF RECALL IN THE COURTS
This chapter will examine the development of the general aspects
of recall within the context of case law and judicial interpretation.
The constitutional validity of recall will be discussed within a
historical framework emphasizing its various legal ramifications.
The legal development as presented through the use of court
'
decisions and judicial interpretation is included for the areas

covering validity for grounds of recall, the signature requirement
for recall petitions, general procedural technicalities , certain
restrictions in the recall law, and the various clerical duties and
responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the city clerk and municipal
legislative council.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF RECALL IN THE COURTS

In any field as politically explosive as recall, it is difficult
to legislate clearly.

This has been particularly true in California.

Confusion was created by the multiplicity of laws dealing with the
procedures of recall in charter cities, counties, and districts·.

The

lal-7 lacked uniformity and was not clearly understood by the average
layman.
Reflecting the difficult task that faced the courts over interpretation of the law, the supreme court in the early twentieth century
warned:
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Our complicated system of city government, which gives
each city above a certain size power to adopt a charter for
its own government, and our numerous statutes relating to and
providing for the recall of elective officers, tend to create
a great confusion on the subject, and when a decision of the
court is resorted to the particular city and particular law
on which the decision is predicated; Otherwise the legal profession is likely to be misled in regard to the construction
of the particular law in controversy .!
Because litigation was relatively easy there was plenty of
opportunity for the courts to give it an adequate hearing.

According

to Bird and Ryan litigation so frequently accompanied recall movements
that resort to the courts became one of the unique features of the

Recourse through the courts by an officer whose recall was being
sought became a natural and understandable tactic.

Any delay in the

proceedings is certainly to the incumbent's advantage.

Temporary

suspension of the momentum in a recall drive exploits one of the inherent weaknesses of popular government--public apathy.

Any delay due

to litigation proceedings usually blunts the issues of political
conflict.3
The most common procedures for obstructing recall proceedings
are, according to former Secretary of State Pat Sullivan , fairly
simple.4

The incumbent or incumbents, if such are on the city council

for example, may influence a majority of the body to refuse action
lwright v. Engram, 186

c.

659 (1921).

2Frederick L. Bird and Francis M. Ryan. The Recall of Public Officers:
A Study of the Operation of Recall in Ca lifor;Ia (New York : The MacMillan
Company, 1930), p. 313 .
3Bird and Ryan, p. 314.
4rnterview with Pat Sullivan, January 14, 1971.
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on the special election.

Often council members simply ignore the

petition calling for a special recall election.

When such situations

exist, the proponents of recall file a writ of mandate to compel the
municipal legislative body to call a special election for the purpose
of recalling a public official .
council--then

w~ll

The respondent--which is the city

often file a demurrer to the recall petition

taking excepti on to the sufficiency of some point in law in the
recall procedure, e. g ., insufficient signatures on the petition.

The

writ of mandate is issued by a court of law commanding the performance
of some specific duty, e. g., calling for the special election.
It appears that the legislature's intent was to keep matters of
direct legislation out of the courts as much as possible.

Suspicion

and distrust of the courts was one of the primary catalysts for the
recall plan, yet in the actual practice of affairs , the courts have
been called in to obstruct or to order recall elections.
Direct le gislation was also inaugurated because the state legislature was not properly fulfilling its function as a legislative body.S
To make up for this deficiency it was hoped that the initiative,
referendum, and recall would give the people a greater voice in the
affairs of government .

Ironically , within two decades, recall became

controlled by the ve ry political agencies it was created to check.6
While the early trend in recall decisions at the appeals level
started out quite liberal, there has been a recent trend turning
Sit was felt that courts were usurping this function.
6The 1931 leg islature passed considerable amounts of legislation
dealing with recall and was subsequently to continue making change s
and additions to the law.
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toward a strict construction of the law.

This will be dealt with

more specifically later in the chapter.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RECALL

The first case involving recall in an American court received
a favorable ruling.

Judge Frank D. Oster of the Los Angeles Superior

Court stated in his 1904 opinion that recall is "entitled to receive
a liberal construction" and tha t the recall scheme 'tvas fully constitutional. 7
Three years later the court in Good v. Common Council 5 C. A. 265
(1907) upheld the constitutionally of recall and introduced an interesting concept to the interpretation of recall.

The court in justi-

fying its conclusions regarding the constitutional validity of recall
introduced into its decision the well recognized rule that the " agency
may be terminated at any time by the sovereign power without r eason
given."8
This subscribed to the progressive principle of "peopl e as sovereign" and contributed to a liberal construction of r ecall and its
relations hip to concepts of direct democracy.

The principle of agency--

"may be terminated • • • without reason given"--also provides considerable
insight into the philosophy providing a general and lib eral construction
for the grounds of recall.9
7Quoted in the Los Angeles Express, August 29, 1904.
Bird and Ryan, pp. 315-316.

Cited in

8Good v. Common Council 5 C. A. 265, 269 (1907).
9Further mention r e lating to the grounds for recall will be made in
another section of the chapter.
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The court in Good v. Common Council supra, engaged in some philosophising in their opinion, contributing early to an interpretation
that was to be relied upon by the courts following the 1911 addi tion
of recall to the general law.
The fixing of the tenure of office of the officers of a
municipality subject to removal by the body that elected them
is comparatively new in our system of government, and the interpretive branch of the law is in r a ther an undeveloped state on
the subject. A responsible government, however, is the very
foundation of the republican system, and there appears no reason
why a representative should not be made t o retire at any time
at the reques t of the people • • • , 10
The cour t was clearly expressing sentiments which were soon to
become the political maxims of progressives throughout the state and
nation.

No more clear expression, however, of progressive sentiment

could be found than in this sentence of the court's decision:
Offices are created by the people for administration of
public affairs and not for the benefit of the office-holder ,
and r evocable a t the pleasure of the authority creating them,
unless such authority is limited by the power which conferred
it.ll
It can be seen that even before its s tatewide adoption recall
was deemed to be in accord with the constitution and established
legal principles.

As innovativel2 a procedure as it apparently was,

recall met with little opposition with respect to its constitutional
validity.
Los Angeles Councilman J. P. Davenport, in the first case of
recall to reach an American court, contended that the recall concept
was in violation of the U• .s. Constitution regarding due process of
lOGood v. Common Council, supra, 267, 268.
11The court relied upon Attorney General v. Jochin, 99 Mich. 358 ,
p. 269, for this principle,
l2critics of recall would have said r adical.
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law.

As Bird and Ryan point out, Davenport maintained that an office-

holder held property in his office and it could therefore not be taken
without due process of law.l3

The court decla red Davenport ' s argumen t

to be inaccurate in that a public office is not property , but a mere
agency.
Recall of elective state officers derived its authority direc t ly
f r om the organic law .

Recall in cities lvas provided for by a grant

of authority included in the provision providing for recall of state
officials.
The express provision providing for the recall of city officials
is found i n Article 23, of the state constitution where it states
that recal l shall be exercised by the electors of each city of the
state under the procedure required by law.l4

In the case of charter

cities , the article provided that in such cases l egislative bodies
of the respec tive cities could es tablish their own proceduresl5 or
coul d , as unchartered cities were required, subscribe to the general
law of recall as adopted by statutes passed by the legislature to
facilitate its operation.l6
The new amendment of 1911 was fully in line with Article 4 of
the State Constitutionl7 which provides for direct legislation powers
of cities that come under the authority of the state l egis lature,
unless the city has a charter .
l3Bird and Ryan, p. 315 .
14california State Cons titution, Article 23, Sec . 13 .
15california St a te Cons titution , Article 23, Sec. 14.
16california State Cons titution , Article 23, Sec . 16 .
l 7california Stat e Cons titution , Article 4, Sec. 25.
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This relationship with the organic law was held to be valid.

In

the important 1911 decision, the court held that the method of removing
an elected city official was purely a municipal affair "which in no
way conflicted'' with the State Constitution.l8
Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 176 C. 84, held constituional in
accordance with the California Constitution, the act providing for
recall in municipa l corporations,l9 which received the major grants
of authority providing for recall in Ca lifornia cities . 20
Reaffirming the Hill decision, the California Supreme Court in
Lindsey v. Dominquez, 217 C. 533 (1955), confirmed that election of
municipal officers is exclusively a municipal affair and added that no
cm~rt

could determine otherwise.
The power to cut short an elective official's term was unques-

tionably given to the people by the constitutional amendment of 1911
and subsequent statutes enacted pursuant to that power.21

The courts

and body of le gal thought overwhelmingly held that recall 't.;ras completely
valid and did not violate the provision of the California Constitution.
In the late thirties the City Council of El Monte challenged
the state constitutional validity of the 1931 Municipal Elective
Officers Recall

La~.;r.

The criticisms rendered by the Council dealt

with matters of policy, wisdom, and technique for r ecalling e lective
lBconn v. City Council, p. 717.
19stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 359.
20The act of 1911 providing for reca ll in municipa l corporations
amended the Mar ch 13, 1883 "Act to Provide for the Organization, Incorporation, and Government of Hunicipal Corporations ."
21Laam v. McLaren , 28 C. A. 632 (1915).
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officers as provided for in the act.

The Council claimed that these

were matters of a legislative nature for

~-1hich

the courts had little

concern.
The court in this case, Baertschiger v. Leffler, 36 C. A. 2d 208
(1959), did, hm-1ever, hold that the Municipal Elective Officers
Recall Law22 was not violative of any part of the California Constitution.

The case is significant because it held that statutory provi-

sions for recall could be codified into a body of general law Jealing
specifically with the procedures and provisions of recall.

Further

codifications were made ·in 1939 and 1961.23
III.

RECALL'S LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

A statute, where it is fairly susceptible to a construction that
is in harmony

~-1ith

the California Constitution, i s to be liberally

construed and made to comport

~vi th

l egislative intent.

This principle

was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chesebrough v. San Francisco,
153 C. 559 (1926), and was more specifically stated in Cohn v. Isensee,
45 C. A. 531 (1920), where the court held that in interpretation,
l egis lative intent is the controlling factor:

"The purpose of all

rules of cons truction is to ascertain, if possible the intention of
the legislature .

For it is the legislative intent that must contro1."24

22stats., 1931, p. 563.
231931 was the first year recall was codified into the Political
Codes. In 1939 a gene r al recodification of the political codes took
place and in 1961 election provisions were codified into the presen t
form of Election Codes.
24 cohn v. Isens ee, p. 538.
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Initially the courts received recall quite favorably and applied
to it the liberal interpretation that appeared in keeping with the
intent of the progressive-minded legislature.
The decision in Conn v. City Council, supra , stated that a city
charter should receive a liberal construction "with a view to promoting
the purpose for which it was enacted by the people.

u25

This

interpretation by the 1911 court has affected subsequent decisions
relating to recall and is 0ften cited.
Laam v. McLaren, 28 C. A. 632 (1915), provided another important
statement on the application and philosophy of recall maintaining that
statutes enacted aiding the organic provisions of recall should be
construed liberally and should not be interfered with by the courts
"except upon a cl~ar showing that the law is being violated."26
Further

co~ent

is rendered on the philosophical and legal defin-

ition of recall in the case of Robinson v. Anderson, 26 C. A., 644
(1915).

By implication the court broadened the legal construction of

recall provisions to ensure that original intent is always guarded .
The words of the court s ugges ted a precedent-setting principle that
was to be applied in future cases :

"The statute must be . given effect

rather than have applied to it a construction which will nullify the
apparent intent of the legislature • • • • " 2 7

Subsequent cases which

proceeded in the same interpretive ve in r egarding the liberal construction are Worth v. Downey, 74 C. A. 436 (1925); 1-iagoon v . Heath, 79 C. A.
25conn v. City Council, p. 712.
26 Laam v. McLaren, p. 638.
27Robinson v. Ande rson, p. 646.
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632 (1926); and Othmer v. City Council of Long Beach, 207 C. 263
(1929), "Statutes should be liberally construed so as to promote the
purpose for which they were enacted."28
No complete records of the cases going only to superior court ,
or county courts of the state a r e available, but according to Bird
and Ryan the county courts were inclined to observe a conservative
Higher courts on appeal wer~ in the

construction of the law.29

twenties , liberal in their interpretation of the intent and law of
recall.
The courts have been reluctant, generally, to defeat fair expres' sions of popular will as exhibited in elections and will not do so
unless the law permits no other alternative.30
IV.

OFFICERS SUBJECT TO RECALL

That general law cities were to abide by the statutes and codes
passed by the legislature, as granted by Article XXIII, for recall was
expressly stated in the court's decisions of Rutledge v . Dominquez,
122 C. A. 680 (1932) and Goodman v. Dominquez, 122 C. A. 784 (1932).
In the decisions of Rutledge and Goodman the court commented
upon the constitutional source which gave cities express authority to
enac t their own recall proc'e dures.

In their ruling the court held

that cities \vere legitimately granted such express authority in
28othmer v. City Council ££Long Beach, p. 275.
29Bird and Ryan, p. 341.
30Law v. San Francisco, 144 C. 384 (1904); See also J ennings v.
Bro\vn~l4 C~07 (1896); and Packwood v. Brownell, 121 C. 478 (1898).
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Article XI of the California Constitution which provides for the
organization of cities under a

freeholder's charter.

The provision

states:
It shall be competent in any charter framed under the
authority ·of this section to provide that the municipality
governed thereunder may make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs • • • • 31
In 1916 it was held in the decision of Shaefer v. Herman, 172 C.
338 (1916), that the removal of officers by recall in cities having
charters providing for the procedure was a municipal affair and not
controlled by general laws inconsistent with charter provisions.
The Shaefer case involved the attempted recall of San Francisco's
city attorney Percy V. Long.

Failure on the part of the board of

election commissioners to call for the special election was due to
the absence of properly dated signatures on the petition.
The respondents, wishing to prevent the recall election, claimed
that the above-mentioned petition was void due to its failure to
conform to the provisions of section
amended in 1915.

1083~

of the Political Code, as

The particular provision in the general law that

the respondents referred to was the section requiring an affixed date
next to the signer's name on a recall petition.
The San Francisco charter, however, had no such provision,
requiring only a signer's address.

The court, citing Coffey v.

Superior Court, 147 C. 525 (1905), reiterated the rule that where a
freeholder's charter has provided a mode of removal of officers, the
general law cannot control the exercise of the power in that manner,
or change the procedure required by the charter.
31Article XI, Section 8.
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The principle that municipal charters were controlling in municipal affairs was firmly expressed in Betkouski v. Superior Court,
34 C. A. 117 (1917).

In their ruling the court said that in acts of

the legislature regarding recall which are inconsistent with charters-the charter will control.32
If a municipal charter does not provide for r ecall, the courts
I

have ruled that such power, by a court of law, may be read into the
charter and permit the electors to exercise direct legislation procedures, including recall, in accord with general law provision.33
principle expands considerably the opportunity for recall
anywhere.

t~

This

be used

It appears tha t the courts have provided recall with the

broadest app lication possible and have followed the tradition of liberal construction in this respect.
V.

GROUNDS FOR RECALL

As Bird and Ryan suggest, the question of the sufficiency of
grounds for recall was a subject of considerable litigation in the
early years of r ecall history.34

The result of such notable litigation

regarding the sufficiency of grounds has l ed to the incorporation into
almost all the r ecall laws of California the provision that the statement of grounds "is intended solely for the information of the voters
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and no insufficiency in the form or substance thereof shall affect the
validity of the election or proceedings."35
The first major case dealing with recall in a charter city
touched on the issues of proper grounds for recall.

Certain citizens

of San Diego were seeking to recall City Councilman Jay N. Reynolds
due to the alleged charges that his performance and discharge of
duties while in office were in opposition to the will and preferences
of his constituents.
Reynolds had incurred the wrath of citizens apparently because of
his vote in favor of an ordinance regulating the licensing of liquors
within the city.
occasions

This along with the charge that he had on several

obstructed referenda and other expressions of the people's

will brought about the campaign for his removal.
The city council refused to act upon the recall petition and
voted to "table and file the same without action."
In this case, Good v . Common Council, 5 C. A. 265 (1907), the
appellate court stated that while charges of malfeasance, misfeasance,
or nonfeasance were certainly applicable, the principle involving the
grounds for recall should be liberally construed to go beyond such
"specific" charges to more enlarged issues of answerable or

responsibl~

tenure.
In the matter of grounds for recall the most significant case in
this area is Conn v. City Council, supra, in which the court firmly

35out of the nine charte r cities adhering to their O\VU recall procedures, three diffe r from the general statement on grounds as stated
by the general law. These three cities are Long Beach, San Bernardino,
and Stockton; all three omit general law guidance in making a statement
of grounds for the recall.
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enunciated the principle that the statement and reasons given for
recall were only for furnishing information to the electors.

In this

respect the court declared:
Petitions are only required to state generally their
grounds or reasons for demanding the removal of the obnoxious
officer, for the obvious and only purpose, it seems to us furnishing information to the people of the community, upon which
a political issue rather than an issue at law may be raised
and determined.36
The principle that grounds for recall were matters of a political
nature is very significant.

The court in this area seems to be in

full accord with legislative intent which in part sought to keep the
substantive determinations of recall out of judicial jurisdiction and
into the hands of the people.
If grounds were held to be an issue at law, specific charges
would have been required-- such as malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance-- and the traditionally held liberal construction of the recall
could have very well been abandoned.37
The court also held true to Progressive principles and legislative
intent when it stated that:
• • • it is clearly the privilege of the people at the
polls, rather than the province of the courts, to pass upon
the sufficiency of the grounds stated for the removal of an
elected officer by the modern method of a recall election .38
This statement in the decision affirmed the point which Progressives, and especially Hiram Johnson, made with regard to the right of
36conn v. City Council, supra, p. 712.
37Recent attempts have been made to incorporate the malfeasance,
misfeasanc e, or nonfeasance requirement into the law governing recall.
If this were done, judicial interpretation over these charges would
almost likely be so ambiguous and multifarious that the purpose for the
new standards would be defeated.
38conn, supra, pp. 712-713.
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an intelligent, reasoned electorate to determine its political destiny.
In the case Good v. Common Council, supra, a legal principle was
stated which has always been an inhe rent political principle with regard
to the recall.

The Good, supra, court cited Croly v. Sacramento, 119

C. 234 (1897) out of which the well recogni zed rule that the agency
may be t e rminated at any time by the sovereign power without reason
given.

This then, more or less, cap tures Progressive philosophy and

aids in better understanding principles of legislative intent.
Several attempts have been made, by officers whose recall was
sought, to challenge the sufficiency of the grounds for recall.

Most

notable among the cases is Laam v. McLaren, 28 C. A. 632 (1915) which
the court refused to uphold a challenge against the validity of a
recall petition containing what the officer thought were ins ufficient
grounds.

The court was emphatic in its ruling by stating:

• the statement of grounds is intended solely for the
information of the electors, and whether the plaintiff or the
court to which he appeals regards them as sufficient grounds
for the plaintif f ' s removal is inwaterial, as is also whether
the grounds are true or false. The voters to whom the question
of recall or r emoval is submitted ar e the judges of the sufficiency of the grounds.39
Here again the court reflects a theme inherent in the Progressive
philosophy and in accord with legislative intent.

The voters--the

people--and not the courts nor the legislature were to be the sole
judges of the grounds for recall.

It was, after all, a political and

not a legal question.
In another case , Ratlo v. Board of Trustees of the City of South
San Francisco , 75 C. A. 724 (1925), a group of trustees demurred to a
39Laam v. McLaren, p. 638.
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petition on the grounds that the charges were insufficien t of facts,
ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain.

The court in its ruling

stated, as it had in Laam v. McLaren, supra, that the grounds were
solely for the sake of information, and the sufficiency was not a
question for the courts or trustees to decide.40
VI.

RECALL AND CRIMINAl, RESPONSIBILITY

The first case in r ecall history that dealt with the issue of
libel was in 1925, State of Washington v . Wilson, 241 Pac. 970 . 41
The proponents of recall in the case argued that the truth or falsity
of statements made in charges are absolutely qualified and can only
be determined at the recall election for such election and exercise
is political.
In response the court stated:

"Voters are not to be given carte

blanche the privilege of making any allegations or statements concerning
any officer sought to be recalled regardless of the truth or probable
truth thereof • • • • "42
Thus the court denied that the matter of the petition is absolutely privileged, but may be qualifiedly privileged.

This case along

with the California cases to be pr esented here makes it fairly clear
that great l atitude is allowed in the- matter of statements relating
to grounds for recall, but can be actionable when malice is proven.
In California the important and inevitable question of criminal
responsibility for statements made in recall charges came up in Gunsul
40see also Martin v. Board of Trustees, 96 C. A. 705 (1929).
4lsee also 43 American Law Reports 1263, 1267, 1268.
42state of Washington v. Wilson, 241 Pac. 970 (19 25) .
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v. Ray, 6 C. A. 2d. 528 (1935) .'•3

Myrtle Gunsul, auditor for the

city of Long Beach, was charged by recall proponents of taking unauthor-

I

ized funds f rom the city.

Gunsul charged libel after the accusation

was included in the recall statement and published.
Ray, the defendant, held that the statement was absolutely privi-·
leged unde r section 47 of the Civil Code where it states a privileged
publication or broadcas t is one made, "In any (1) legislative or
(2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law."

The court ruled that recall is neither a legis-

lative or judicial proceeding.

It stated, in apparent cognizance of

the Conn decision, that recall is political rather than official in
nature.44

Therefore, the court held that communications in recall

proceedings are qualifiedly privileged where no malice is apparent.45
Under a qualified privilege, or conditional privilege, the
party communicating is protected by law from libel and slander action
unless actual malice and prior knowledge of falsity of the statement
is known.
In cases of recall, qualified privilege can usually be relied
upon for legal shelter because the communication, or charges against
43In the study of recall published in 1930 by Bird and Ryan, neither
appellate nor supreme court had yet passed judgment on a case involving
the issue of libel in statements appearing on the petitions.
44"0fficial proceeding" is defined in 46 Corpus Juris 1085, as a
"term denoting action t aken by an officer." An "official act" is defined
in 46 Corpus Juris 1084, as " any act done by the officer in his official
capacity under color and by virtue of his office." Neither is true in
the case of recall.
45"Qualified privilege" comprehends communications that are made
without apparent malice upon a matter in which the author has an
interest. See Swift and Co. v. Gray, 101 F2d 976: and also California
Civil Codes , Section 47, part 6 .
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a public official, may be held as a matter of public interest.

Usually

in any matter of "public interest"--and recall would certainly fit
here--qualified privilege may be claimed.
In the Gunsul case, however, the court ascertained that malice
was present and held that the case was therefore actionable.
m1ile malice was proven to the satisfaction of the court, it
declared that complaints charging libel based upon communications in
the recall proceedings "must contain a proper allegation of malice., •. " 46
Thus, the burden of proof for libel rests upon the plaintiff.
In 1964 the appeals court acted upon a similar case involving
recall and libel in Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 C. A. 2d 237.47
In the Kramer case a particularly "aggressive" recall campaign
was carried on in Seaside against two members of the city council,
Bessie W. Kramer and Thomas A. Dorney.

The proponents of the recall

charged Kramer and Dorney with conflict of interest in several official
dealings and with failure to properly represent the voters of Seaside.
During the recall campaign, the proponents displayed posters
throughout the city depicting Kramer and Dorney as puppets on strings,
being controlled by the hand of an unidentified puppeteer.

The poster

urged the recall of "Dorney and Kramer" and asked the question, "Tired
of puppets in your City Government?"
A letter was also circulated by the proponents charging that
"Mrs. Kramer ,and Mr. Dorney are not masters of their own fate--that they
are, in fact, the dupes of a most undesirable element in Seaside."
46Gunsul v. Ray, 6 C. A. 2d 528, 530, 531 (1935).
47Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 C. A. 2d 237 (1964).
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The court charged that the publications mentioned above imputed
dishonesty and corruption to the council members and were libelous
per se.48

Yet, libel was not actionable unless charges were made

with malice.
In the trial proceedings, the court awarded punitive damages in
both actions against the proponents of r ecall, thus implying that
malice was present in the actions of the defendants.

Such malice,

as the court pointed out, destroys the qualified privilege.
The Kramer case is important because it represents a fairly
recent interpretation by the courts that statements made in connection
with the recall proceedings are not absolutely privileged49 but may
be libelous if malice can be proven.
VII.

SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS

Apparently the established signature requirement for recall
petitions is arbitrary with no compelling reasons for the specific
percentage demanded by law.50
The courts have adhered to legislative intent in making the
requirement what it is.

In their ruling in Magoon v. Heath, 27 C. A.

632 (1926), the court said:
48Kramer v. Ferguson, supra, 242.
49A privileged communication with rega rd to the law of defamation
is a communication "which would be defamatory and actionable, except
for the occasion on which, or the circumstances unde r which, it was
made." See James A. Ballentine, Ballentine's Law Dictiona ry, ed.
William S. Anderson (third edition; San Francisco: Bancroft-\Vhitney
Company, 1969).
SOThe California Constitution Revision Commission has found no reason
for the percent of electors required to sign petitions and sees no
reason for its change in either direction. California Cons titution
Revision Commission, Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, May, 1968,
p. 21.
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We think it is clear that the intent of the legislature
in providing for twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast
was to give some assurance that there was a substantial demand
for the removal of an elective officer before the recall
might be invoked. • • • n51
While the twenty- five percent signature requirement is an arbitrary
figure, in most cases,52 it is a reasonable provision capable of
dealing with the political situation of municipal government.

When

the signature requirement was lowered to twelve percent of the voters
of the city, problems developed that had not existed when the requirement was at the twenty-five percent (of the votes cast in the last
preceding municipal election) level.53
In overturning a previous 1915 decision, Robinson v. Anderson,
26 C. A. 644 (in which the court declared that the signature requirement should be based upon the "vote cast at the regular election at
which the officer was elected, rather than a subsequent election for
othe r trustee offices not including that which the officer in question
occupies . ") .

The Magoon , supra, court held that the basis for the

percentage of signatures required should be based on the last general
municipal election rather than a special election at which the office
might have been filled.

The court's reasoning for this ruling54 was

51Magoon v. Heath, 79 C. A. 632, 635 .
52 Further comment will be made regarding the percent requirement
and municipal political realities in the next chapter .
53 This was d'iscussed in the preceding chapter.
54court ruled that the signature requirement should be based upon
the "vote cast at the regular election at which the officer was e l ec ted,
rather than a s ub sequent e l ec tion for other trustee offices not including
that which the officer ln que s tion occupies." This ruling permitted
the signature r e quirement to be based on special e lections, if the
officer was elected to said office in such an election, a t which the
voter turnout is considerably less .
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based on what they believed to have been the intent of the legislature.
This is expressed in the court's opinion which states:
We think it is clear that the intent of the legislature
in providing for twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast
was to give some assurance that there was a substantial demand
for the removal of an elective officer before the recall might
be invoked, and in providing that it should be the l ast
general municipal election we think it is apparent that they
had in mind the rapidly grm-ling incorporated cities and tmms
where the vote cast at the las t regular municip al election
might be considerably l arger than at previous regul ar municipal elections • • . . 55
This s eems to be the clearest statement explaining the rationale
behind the original provision for the signature percentage requirement.
The criteria upon which the twenty-five percent requirement was based
changed in 1957,56 accompanied by s tatutory amendments making easier
the clerk's duties in processing recall petitions.

The 1926 Magoon

case was the last major case involving the signature requirement to
reach the appellate courts.
VIII.

PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES

The appellate courts in most areas of recall generally took a
liberal view of the technical requirements and ruled in favor of
recall proponents wherever possible.57
Such is the tradition of Worth v. Downey, supra, where the Board
of Supervisors for the City of Lynwood refused to call a special
election for the recall of one of their members, Frank M. Downey, on
the grounds that the petition did not contain a specific statement
s~agoon, supra, 636.

56stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2636.
57This principle was established in Rakow v. Swain, 178 C. A. 2d
895 (1960).

72

demanding the election of a successor.

The court held that petitions

need only be in language which meets the statutory requirements.58
It was the final opinion of the court that the petitions complied with
the state statute's implied meaning.
The Conn v. City Council, supra, decision declared that if every
technicality was adhered to regarding recall proceedings "it would
be practically impossible to invoke a recall election."59

The ruling

was in response to the Richmond city council's failure to call a
opecial recall election because some signers of the petitions did not
sign their full names but gave only initials.

In Chester v. Hall,

55 C. A. 611 (1921), the court stated that the law of recall is to
be liberally construed, taking into account the particular set of
circumstances in each situation.
In the Chester case, for example, the court held that while some
signatures on a recall petition did not have dates affixed to them,
enough signatures were dated in order that the clerk could adequately
determine if the signers were qualified electors at the time of
signing.

The purpose for such a requirement, said the court, was

simply to guard against signatures by persons who at the time of
signing were not qualified electors .
This spirit of liberal interpretation was reversed somewhat in
Chambers v. Glenn Colusa, 57 c .. A.

1?~,

(1922), declaring, with regard

to the requirement on affixed dates, that.:._:the law is unequivical and
should be made mandatory in all cases .
58nowney, supra, 713.
59conn v. City Council, 17 C. A. 705, 713.
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This principle was upheld in Maycock v. Kerr, 216 C. 171 (1932),
when the supreme court upheld the refusal of the registrar to accept
for filing and certification on initiative petition which was required
to have precinct numbers but did not .

The court rendered an author-

itative interpretation:
• • • the constitution itself provides that the precinct
numbers must appear on the petition, and this must necessarily
mean that such precinct numbers must appear on the petition
at the time the petition is presented to the registrar of
voters.60
The trend of liberal construction by the courts regarding the
procedural technicalities of recall may be in eclipse.

Appellate courts

have become less inclined to rule in favor of recall proponents even
though the procedural oversights may be relatively minimal.
Beginning with the 1960 case; Rakow v. Swain, 178 C. A. 2d 895,
the courts have tended to place the full burden for technical execution
upon the proponents.

For example, in the Rakow case the court ruled,

contrary to its tradition of liberal construction, that while the clerk
could assist proponents in execution of routine duties, the burden
to ascertain the number of registered voters rests upon the circulators
and not the city.
Though somewhat obliquely applicable to .municipal recall, a case
involving the attempted recall of California Governor Ronald Reagan
gives some indication of the court's direction on the matter of technical requirements.
In Lee v. Superior Court, 265 C. A. 2d 49 (1968), the court held
against the Recall Reagan Committee which on July 31, 1968 , filed

6~aycock v. Kerr, 216 C. 171, 173 (1932).
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with the Registrar of Voters a petition to recall Governor Ronald
Reagan.

Some precinct numbers had been omitted and the Committee

requested of Regis trar Lee permission to add the numbe rs after the
filing date of July 31.

Lee refused, claiming that the law did not

authorize him to allow such remedial activity after the filing date.
The committee took their grievance to the Superior Court of
Los Ange les requesting a court order allowing the proponents of
Reagan's recall to add the missing precinct numbers.
On August 12, the court issued a preemptory writ of mandamus
directing Lee to permit at least 50 volunteers in the Registrar of
Voters office to work on correcting and adding precinct numbers to
the petitions.

Lee was also directed to give his fullest possible

. cooperation.
The decision of the Superior Court was an exceptionally magnanimous one, and went far beyond its scope of authority .

The appellate

court in Lee v. Superior Court, supra, struck down the ruling declaring
Superior Court's lack of jurisdiction.
In recent years the court has refused to bend the statutory
r equirements and t e chnical procedures must usually be met by the
proponents of a r ecall.
Fraud and dis- assembled petitions .

There has been some question

as to the form of the petition and its relations hip to the number of
officials sought to be recalled.
ways.

The procedure can be executed in two

A joint petition may be circulated to remove officials en bloc.

In this case the voter signs to recall all against whom the petition is

.

..... ,.
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directed.

I~,

however, an elector favors recalling only one of the

group he must sign a sep arate petition.61
Petitions may be circulated in sections to facilitate the procedure, but are held to be void if circulated in separate sections
where it is dissassembled and the signature sheets are removed from
the notice, statement , and answer, and then filed as a reassembled
unit.

The ruling on this matter is found in the case of Cunningham

v. City Council of the City of Stanton, 200 C. A. 340 (1962) , where
the court declared that each petition shall bear a copy of the notice,
statement, and answer on the face of each and every section.6 2
In the Cunningham, supra, case the City Council of Stanton
refused to call for a special recall election intended for two of
their members of the grounds that the proponents had circulated a
fraudulent petition.
The proponents had circulated a face--or fact-- sheet containing
in proper form the notice, statement, and answer with blank sheets
of paper underneath containing numbered lines intended for signatures.
These blank sheets were separated from the face sheet and circulated
for signatures.
The court held with the council in this case, stating that when
the signed signature sheets were removed from the face shee t they
lost their identity as a section of the recall petition .

"Such a

situation," the court stated, "is contrary to the apparent intent of
61Lynn v. City Council of Culver City, 105 C. A. 182 (1930); see also
re " singular" petitions, Bricker v . Banks, 98 C. A. 87.
62cunningham v. Clty Council£! the City
340, 342 (1962).

££ Stanton, 200 C. A. 2d
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the statute which attempts to relegate city council action in the
premises to the performance of a ministerial duty.63
The decision apparently was based on the intention of discouraging
cases of fraud and keeping all possibilities of misunderstanding at
a minimum.
In the case of fraud the courts have required substantial evidence
to back up such charges.64

The burden of proof is upon the appellants

and they must, to the satisfaction of the courts, show
wrongdoing.

evid~nce

of

An allegation of fraud must show the ultimate facts which

amount to fraud or it is insufficient.65

Otherwise, it is presumed

that the law is obeyed and will be liberally construed,66

If fraud

has been committed, a court of equity may be resorted to as the proper
forum to determine such questions under appropriate proceedings.67
If an elector feels that a case of fraud has been committed or
that his signature was acquired by misrepresentation and is dissatisfied, he may withdraw his signature by submitting a request for withdrawal to the clerk and such a request will be honored.

However, once

the petition is filed, names may not be withdrawn.6 8
63rbid.
64Brown v. City Council of the City of Hawthorne, 103 C. A. 113 (1930).
65 Baroldi v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 472, 477; Lavine v. Jessup, 161
C. A. 2d 59, 69; Richardson v. City of Redondo Beach, 132 C. A. 426,
433; Peckham v. City of Watsonville, 138 C. 242, 244; Scafidi v. Western
Loan and Building Company, 72 C. A. 2d 550, 553.
66Laam v. McLaren, supra.
67williams v. Gill, 65

c.

A. 129.

68Beecham v. Burns, 34 C. A. 759; Covell v. Lee 71 C. A. 361;
Knowlton v. Hezmalhalch, 32 C. A. 2d 419; Uhl v . Collins 271 C. 1;
McAulay v . Board of Supervisors, 178 C. 628; however, once the paper is
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IX.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREQUENCY OF RECALL

One of the most significant and recent cases dealing with recall
is Moore v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892 (1966), in which
the court ruled on the frequency of filing consecutive petitions.
The case in Maywood involved an attempted recall of Councilman
John kearny and Councilwoman Maymie Anderson.

The first recall

attempt of thes e council memb ers was voided because the city clerk
discovered the dates added by some of the signers were prior to
December 17, 1965, the day upon which the petitions were legally
eligible for circulation and signing.
The petitions were returned to the proponents without any certification attached to those advising the party that the eligible signatures did not amount to twenty-five percent of the total registered
voters.
The petitioners made a second attempt to recall Kearney and
Anderson on February 16, 1966.

The

petit~ons

were circulated and

filed with the City Clerk of Maywood on March 29, 1966.

The petitions

were found to be sufficient and were promptly submitted to the Maywood
City Council for the ordering of a special election.

The council

declined to call a special election for recall purposes asserting that
within six months preceding March 29, the recall petitions had been
filed, thus precluding a l egal filing for failure to wait the six month
period as r equired by law (Election Code, section 27500).
filed, names may not be withdrawn. See Rogers v. Board of Direc tors
of Pasadena 218 C. 221; and Uhl v. Collins, supra. See also 18 Ops.
Ca. Atty. Gen., 86 87 (1951)--.--
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The court was given the task of determining, (1) the definition
of "filing" of a recall petition--that is, what constitutes a "filing"
within the meaning of Elections Code, section 27500; and most importantly the court attempted to resolve what was thought to be a conflict
in the Elections Code between sections 27500 and 27511.
Section 27511 reads:

" . • . the failure to secure sufficient

names shall not prejudice the filing later of an entirely new petition
to the same effect."

Section 27500 reads:

"Proceedings may not be

commenced against the holder of an office who has had a recall petition
filed against him within a period of six months."

The court rose to

this difficult occasion and ruled:
In our opinion any filed recall petition bearing the
clerk's certificate of sufficiency does not prohibit the filing
of a new petition to the same effect for six months or any
other particular time interval.69
The court interpreted the words "filing later" of section 27511
as being vague in meaning, not denoting any specific interval of time. ·
It was the belief of the court that the legislature intended to
prevent the costly holding of frequent special elections rather than
the mere filing of successive recall petitions that may be found to
be insufficient.
The court based the justification of its ruling upon the rationale
of practical behavior.

It said:

A petition certified as insufficient would exclude the
recall of an unfaithful or unscrupulous municipal officer for
a period of 10 to 12 months; and a confederate of s uch an
officer could prevent a recall indefinitely by seriatim r e call
findings of invalid or insufficient petitions.70

69Moore v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892, 902 (1966).
70Ibid.

79
While the court ' s bold ruling may have been a wise one, the
author doubts whether the interpretation rendered was consistent with
the legislature's original meaning of the provision.

The law states

that six months is the waiting period from the last date of filing,71
while the Moore court determined the waiting period to be following
the last recall election.
Regardless of the question involved, the decision of Moore, supra,
stands and represents current interpretation by the courts.
X.

DUTIES OF CLERK AND MUNICIPAL
LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

Filing.

In the Moore case the court handed dmvn another major

clarification in 1966 regarding the legal definition of a "filed"
recall petition.

The court declared that acceptable filing contem-

plated more than a "document,

~vhich

on its face, purports to be a

recall petition and to have appended to it signatures of voters in
the required numbe r."72
The court went on to maintain that before a city clerk can file
a petition, the re must necessarily be a "petition" within the legally
defined meaning of Elections Code, section 27510.

The conclusion of

the court on this matter was that a "petition" constituted, (1) compliance in form with all statutory provisions, and (2) a determination
on the part of the clerk that all such statutory conditions have bee n
satisfactor ily me t.73

Only after such judgments and r equirements

71Elections Code, section 27500.
72Moore , supra , 897 .
73Ibid., 899 .
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have been met can a clerk properly and legally file a recall petition.
Ministerial duties.

The Elections Code requires that the clerk

must, after the recall petition has been filed, "examine and from
the records of registration ascertain whether or not the petition
is signed by the requisite number of voters."74

The courts have

determined that such duties are ministerial in function and not judicial.75

All that the law requires the clerk to do is identify persons

who have signed petitions and compare the names with the records of
registration.76

The certification process must comply with the pro-

visions of the city charter or the courts will nullify the recall.
Such was the case in Davenport v. City of Los Angeles, 146 C. 508
(1905), where the supreme court, in one of its first decisions on
recall, held that improper procedural action on the part of the clerk
could invalidate the \?hole proceedings.

In Koehler v. Board of

Trustees of the City of Coronado, 53 C. A. 155 (1921), the court held
that the clerk's failure to perform his duties properly were grounds
for judicial review.
74california Codes, Section 27510.
75 Baroldi v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 479 (1961); Ogden v. Board of
Trustees City ~f Colton, 74 C. A. 161 (1925); Reites v. Wilkinson,
95 C. A. 2d 827 (1950).
76conn v. City Council, supra.
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In a recent decision77 the court has clar ified the principle
"ministerial" function.

The critical question in determining if an

act required by l aw is ministerial in character is whether it involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion.78

This decision reaffirms

previous decisions t ha t clerks are not clothed with authority to
r e ceive extraneous evidence of the contents of a petition,79 nor do
- they have pm>'er to purge the petition of signatures secured by r eal
or alleged fraud.80

The clerk's duty under the l aw is to do:

no more than verify the purported signatures appearing
on the pe titi on with the great register and certify the result
of tha t examination.Bl
The word "purport," as used in the above decision and in the s tatutes,82
simply refers to an instrument in writing, signifying "on its face"
its sufficiency.83
In cases of more complex and elaborate provisions of recall under
home-rule cha rters, the courts have determined that the action of a
clerk in determining whether or not a recall petition is sufficient
under the provision of s uch a chart e r, and not general l aw, may be
77 Jenkins v. Knight, 46 C. 2d 220 (1956).
78Jenkins, p. 224.
79 Bee chum v. Burns, 34 C. A. 754 (1917).
80Boggs v. Jordan, 204 C. 207 (1928) . See a lso Wright v . Engram,
186 C. 659 (1921); McDonald v . Curry , 15 8 C. 160 (1910). See also
Hartsock v. Merrit , 93 C. A. 365.
8lwilliams v. Gill, 65

c.

A. 129, 132 (1924).

82stats., 1961, Ch. 23; Ca lifornia Codes, Section 27510 .
83 Rakow v. Swain, 17 8 C. A. 2d 895 (1960).
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judicial in character.84

Thus in situations where applicable, the

clerk may be clothed with greater authority to make his determination
of signature petition compliance with charity law.
In cases where fraud has been committed, a court of equity is
the proper forum for recourse85 and such allegations must show ultimate
and substantial evidence.

However, while "it is the clerk and not the

court which mus t determine whether the certificates substantially
comply" with the law,86 such cases may arise where judicia l discernment is necess ary.
Insufficiency of petition.

If the petition is found to be

insufficient, the clerk must so state and return to its proponents,
who then have an additional 15 days to file a supplemental petition.87
The courts have ruled that, unless a charter specifically prohibited,
proponents may make advance preparation for contingency of insufficiency on the first petition by commencing the circulation of supplemental petitions immediately after they have filed the original
petition.88
Council demurrers.

Upon certification of the petition, the

clerk must then notify the city council.89

176

Early in the history of

84Baines v . Zemansky, 176 C. 376 (1917); and Ficker v. Zemansky,
c. 443 (1917).

85Martin v. Board of Trustees, 96 C. A. 705; Watts v. Superior Court,
-36 C. A. 692; l-lilliams v. Gill, 65 C. A. 129.
86Fraser v. Cummings , 48 C. A. 504, 508 (1920).
87stats., 1961, Ch. 23; Califo~nia Codes, Section 27510
88 Reides v. Wilkerson, 99 C. A. 2d 500 (1950).
89Baro1di v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 472 (1961).
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recall, and still to some extent, city councils have demurred to
petitions claiming such pe titions were insufficient, ambiguous, or
fraudulent.

Such has been the case when offic i a ls sought to be

recall ed were council memb ers .

The courts have consequent l y ruled

that no discretion is vested in trustees in the calling of recall
elections,90 and that no power of determina tion as t o the sufficiency
of petition rests with munici pal l egi slative bodies .91

The duties

of municipal councils with regard to r ecall are merely ministerial
and upon the filing of certified petitions, councils must a t once
order a special election for the question of rec all.92

No power is

given by the statutes to legislative municipal bodies to determine
the sufficiency of petitions.93
The courts have indicated in two cases that if the petition is
obviously l acking in the legal requirements of form and s ub stance,
the council may refuse to proceed with its ministerial duties and
its demurrer will be upheld by the court . 94

Otherwise, trustees

have no discretion pursuant t o a petition -that conforms substantially
to the l aw . 95
9~artin v. Board~ Trus t ees , 96 C. A. 705 (1929) .

9 1Ralto v. Board of Trustees of the City of South San Francisco ,
75 C. A. 724 (1925) .
92Baertschiger v. Leffler, 36 C. A. 2d 208 , 212; Ralto v . Board of
Trustees , s upra; Williams v. Gill, s upra, 132; Jenkins v . Knight, supra ,
224; Truman v. Royer, 189 C. A. 2d 109, 115.
93Loche r v. Wals h, 17 C. A. 727 (1911).
94 Conn v . City Counc il, sup r a , 350; and Sidler v. City Council of
Baker"Sf"ield, 43 C. A. 349, 350 .
95Hodges v. Kauffman, 95 C. A. 598 (1928).
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From a brief review of recent court rulings on recall there
appears to be no question that appellate courts have taken a more
"restrictive" view towa rd the compliance of reca ll procedural requirements.

There is no discernible rationale for this trend, though spec-

ulation might suggest that the courts now feel with the greater dissemination of informa tion through improved communication no one should
be naive re garding legal procedures.

The courts might have also taken

this restrictive attitude due to what they cons idere d to be abuses
in recall.

Therefore, strict adherence mus t now be attended to by

all engaged in us ing the popularly-initiated political alternatives
of direct democracy.

CHAPTER V
RECALL IN HOME-RULE CITIES
In connection with this study a postcard survey was conducted
in the spring of 1971 asking either the City Manager or the City
Attorney of each city of California to indicate whether or not any
of the following had occurred between January, 1966 and September,
1971:
a.

A recall election had been held in his city.

b.

A recall petition had been taken out but not filed.

c.

A recall petition had been filed, but had been found to be
inadequate .

d.

A recall movement caused litigation.

Results of the survey in terms of response were surprisingly
successful, yielding a return total of 350 postcards from more than
the 410 cities in California, nearly an 88 percent response.
The following is a brief synopsis of the findings from the
survey:
a.

Only 26 recall e lections took place in the period be tween
January, 1966 and September, 1971. Three of those were in
districts of the same city and two were in Cabazon.

b.

Only eighteen pe titions have been taken out, but not filed
for verification.

c.

Eleven petitions h ave been filed with signatures, but h ave
been found to be insufficient for calling an e lec tion.

d.

In twelve attempts, some litigation has taken place.
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The number of recall elections in relation to the number of
cities is not high, and appears to be on a dmmward swing from the
period of the twenties and thirties.
In the period 1924-1938, out of 270 cities there were 53 municipal
recall elections held. 1

From 1966 to 1971 the re were 26 recalls in

21 different California cities out of a total of 410 cities.
From California's 410 cities, 330 are under the general law status
and 75 are chartered.

Of the ;5 chartered cities, all but 9 have

chosen to be governed concerning recall by the general laws of the
state.

These nine2 abide by their o\m recall provisions.

The remaining

· chartered cities are directed into two categories, cities that are
governed solely by the general law (56) and those governed by general
law, but subject to certain provisions (10).3
I.

OCCURRENCE OF RECALL IN CHARTERED CITIES

This study will illustrate how the difference in signature
requirements is a significant factor in the number of recall elections
which are launche d.
There is unmistakable evidence that suggests the presence of a
discernible pattern in this resp ect, especially when the occurrence
of recall in particular population categories with varying signature
requirements is compared .
!Frederick Bird and Francis Ryan, The , Recall of Public Officers.
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930, p. 344.
2Alamed a , Alhambra, Berkeley, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Palo Alto,
Richmond, San Bernardin_o, Stockton .
3 see table.
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TABLE III
CITIES OF CALIFORNIA USING GENERAL LAW REQUIREMENTS FOR
RECALL, AND CITIES USING THEIR 0\.JN RECALL PROVISIONS
Size Categories

Cities Using Their
Own Recall Provis ions
Numb er
Cities

500,00 up

Number
Recalls

Recall
Index

Cities Using Gene ral Law
Provisions
Numbe r
Cities

Numbe r
Recalls

Recall
Index

1

0

0

3

0

0

soolooo

1

111

1

3

0

0

100,000250l000

3

2@

.67

9

0

0

soloooloolooo

4

1&

.25

43

0

0

25,00050,000

0

0

0

60

4*

.066

lOl00025,000

0

0

0

95

7**

.074

5,00010,000

0

0

0

56

3***

.054

Unde r SlOOO

0

0

0

129

8****

.061

250,000-

II Long Beach
@ Stockton, San Bernardino
& Palo Alto
Note:

The 26 recall elections
here includ e all recall
elections through September , 1971. Data on
number of cities is
from th e League of
California Cities.

*Bell Gardens, Fountain Valley,
Elsinore, San Bruno
** Banning , Imperial Beachl Lompoc,
Sierra Madre, 3 in Seal Beach
*** Anderson, Fillmore, Los Altos .
Hills
**** Avalon, Brisbane, 2 in Cabazon,
Cloverdale, Emeryville , Farmersville , Sand City
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TABLE IV
SIGNATURE PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENTS AND FILING
DEADLINES FOR CALIFORNIA
HOl-1E-RULE CITIES

POP.
CITIES

(1970)

State
Elections
Code

SIGNATURE
REQUIREMENT

DEADLINE
FOR FILING

25% of registered
voters at last report
to Secretary of State.

60 days aft~r filing
notice of intent
tllith City Clerk.

Alameda

79,60~

30% of the total
number of persons
voting at last general
municipal election.

45 days after the
date of filing of
the notice of intention

Alhambra

64,500

25% of the total vote
cast at the last preceding general municipal election.

40 days after the
filing of the
affidavit.

Berkeley

120,300

25% of the registered
electors of the city
on the day the petition is filed with
the city clerk.

75 days from the
filing of the notice
of intention.

Long Beach

389,028

25% of the entire
vote cast at the last
preceding general
municipal election.

State Election Codes.

20% of votes cast for
all candidates for the
office in the last regular district election.

6 months.

12% of number of
registered vote rs at
last general municipal
election.

90 days from filing
of notice of intention.

Los Angeles

Palo Alto

2,948,800

56,000
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TABLE IV
SIGNATURE PERCENTAGE REQUIRE~lliNTS AND FILING
DEADLINES FOR CALIFORNIA
HOME-RULE CITIES

POP.
CITIES

(1970)

Richmond

SIGNATURE
REQUIREt-lliNT

DEADLINE
FOR FILING

81 ,900

25% o£ the entire vote
cast at the las t preceding general municipal election .

None given .

San
Bernardino

107,172

30% of entire vote for
all candidates for the
office cast a t the l as t
preceding general municipal election.

10 days after date
of filing petition .

Stockton

112,400

20% of the entire vo t es
cast at the last preceding general municipal election.

None given.

As Table III indicates, recall has occurred more frequently in
cities governed by spec i fic charter provisions than cities under the
more s trict provisions of the state ' s general law .

In cities which

exceed a population of 50,000, four recalls have t aken place where
indigenous charter provisions were used as opposed to no recalls in
cities where the r eca ll process i s governed by general law.

The

strictness of the genera l l aw provisions, especia lly in terms of
signature requirement, might we ll be a factor in the pattern of recall
incidence.

The recall index for cities u s ing their own recall provi-

sions i s 1. 92 whi l e in general l aw cities the recall index is . 255 .
(See Tab le III)

..J
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As previously mentioned, 21 different cities have experienced
recall between 1966 and 1971.

In dividing up the 21 recall cities

into categories of general law and charter s tatus , a definite pattern
begins to take shape.

Of the 21 cities , four are chartered and have

their own recall procedures.

The remaining 17 are of general law

classification, or at least adhere to general law procedure.
A rough percentage index of these statistics yields the
following:
21 Recall Cities from 1966-1970 Period
1.

Nine cities in the state have their own recall provisions.

2.

396 cities either have general law provisions or are general
law cities.
Cities

Recalls

Index

4

Of the 9 charter:
Of the 396 general law:

17

.44%
.04%

As it can be seen from the information above, there is a considerably higher percentage of recall incidence in chartered cities with
indigenous procedures than in cities that comply with general law
provisions.
Before any valid determination or conclusion can be reached
from these statistics, a comparative evaluation must be made of those
nine charter cities in relation to the remaining ci ties of a general
law orientation.
II.

BREAKDOWN OF THE NINE CHARTER

CITIES HAVING INDIGENOUS RECALL PROCEDURE
Of the nine ch artered cities, four have had recalls within the
1966-1970 period.

The breakdown appears in Table V.

I
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TABLE V
INCIDENCE OF RECALL IN RELATIONSHIP TO POPULATION
OF CALIFORNIA HO~lli-RULE CITIES

Population
50,000-100,000

100,000-200,000

200,000-400,000+

No. Cities
4

3

2

Cities
Alameda
Alhambra
Palo Alto
Richmond
Berkeley
San Bernardino
Stockton
Long Beach
Los Angeles

Recalls

. 1

1
1
1
4
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The chartered cities have an index of .44 in recall incidence
as compared with .04 in general law cities.

Statistically, this

suggests that recall is easier to achieve procedurally in the above
nine cities.

A close comparative examination of their major recall

features will shed further understanding on the index reading.
Here it can be argued that the general law regarding recall
signature requirements may no longer be wise within the context of
present political realities.

Initially, the law, prior to 1953 and

1957, was founded on a politically realistic rationale.

It sought

to base the recall petition requirement on actual voting turnout
rather than a potential electorate.

Every student of voting behavior

knows that in American politics--especially municipal politics-electoral participation is minimal compared to the registered potential.

This point is brought out in a study by Robert Alford and

Eugene Lee on voting turnout in American cities.

The study reports

that the median turnout in partisan elections is approximately 50
percent compared to only 30 percent in non-partisan cities.4
In 1953 the California legislature changed the percentage requirement to 12 percent of the voters of the city.

This means that the

difficulty of securing signatures was raised in most instances.

The

fact that the unit upon which the percentage is based was completely
altered has a bearing on the politics as well as the legal evolution
of the recall concept.
With the 1953 and 1957 changes--basing the signature requirement precentage on registered voters--the original progressive intent
4Robert Alford and Eugene Lee. "Voting Turnout in American Cities,"
American Political Science Review , Vol. 62, September, 1968, p. 796.
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regarding recall as a tool of participatory democracy has become a
partial· misnomer.

This observation is founded on the legal reality

that the most important recall provision is no longer based upon
participation in the democratic process, but rather potential statistical participation as seen in voter registration records.
There is, however, a practical side to the requirement.

The

1953 and 1957 changes made the signature figure less varied from
one election to the next, thus making it easier for the proponents
of recall t9 determine in advance the number of signatures needed
on a petition.

It should be obvious that clerical procedures are

simplified by the more stable figure.

With this in mind one can

see that while the legislature may not have openly gone back on the
principles of the Progressives, it has, however, clearly made it more
difficult to use the right of recall.
Professor Jerry Briscoe, who has made a careful study of the
1967 Stockton recall, observes that in a small town where entrenched
incumbents seem to control the city council, and where there is little
electoral competition, there tends to be contested elections only
occasionaly.

When this happens, through no fault of democracy, there

is a low turnout.5
If the legislature left the recall provision as it stood originally in the 1939 law, there would always be the chance that after
one of these quiet elections, a recall could be roused with practically
no support at all.
5Jerry B. Briscoe, Department of Political Science, University of
the Pacific, Stockton, California.

The importance of electoral politics is voter participation that
is demonstrated, not by registration lists, but by actual votes cast.
This is the line of reasoning, it seems, upon 'vhich the original
signature requirement was founded and

~pon

which the above-mentioned

eight charter cities operate.
The impression of this author from interviews and conversations
held with California state officials is that the present basis for
signature requirement exists in part for reasons of efficiency,
economy, simplicity, and expediency.6

Due to the increased complexity

of modern state and local politics it becomes a burden to exercise
even the slightest clerical function, such as determining proper
signature percentages for zealous petition carriers intent upon
recall.
The evidence points to the conclusion that decline in recalls
in recent years is due to the insurmountable task of acquiring the
required number of signatures in order to validate a recall petition.
The present 25 percent general law provision seems to be a fair
requirement for cities with populations anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000,
but is virtually impossible in the large metropolitan centers of
California.

For example, no recall elections since 1950 have taken

place in either Los Angeles or San .Francisco.

Any successful recall

movement in the larger metropolitan centers would require an is s ue of
tremendous proportions or a very large and hi ghly structured interest
group.
6E. g. Former Secretary of State , Pat Sullivan, State Assemblyman
James Hayes, Legis lative Assistant, Robert Stern, State Senator J ames
tfuetmore, and Assemblyman Charles Conrad.
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III.

PALO ALTO:

A CASE STUDY

In December of 1967 Palo Alto experienced a rather bitter recall
contest which left acute impressions upon its citizens who challenged
the old charter provisions.

Consequently, in 1968 a Citizens Charter

Review Committee was formed to discuss possible reforms of the charter's
recall provisions.

Several salient points on the recall concept came

from the Palo Alto discussion.
Debate over Palo Alto's

~nique

recall ballot.

The charter

under which the 1967 recall--and Palo Alto's only recent recall-took place was unique from the general law in that the name of the
recallee was placed on a ballot containing an alphabetical list of
those running for the office in question.

There is not the usual

question of whether X officer should be recalled, rather the winner
is determined on the basis of a plurality vote.
similar, in principle,

to

This method is

the British system of a "vote of no

confidence."
The citizens of Palo Alto favoring this unique ballot form did
so because it was more likely to "play down" sharp conflict and avoid
the harsh imputations that often accompany recall.7

In contrast to

the more widely used form found in general law provisions, the Citizens
Charter Review Committee argued--almost unanimously--that the Palo
Alto method was fair.

Incumbents and challengers were pitted against

each other on an equal footing.

To win, a challenger had to receive

more votes than the incumbent.
7citizens Charter Review Committee, City of Palo Alto, Minutes of
the Meeting of March 6, 1968, p. 6.

A faction in Palo Alto opposing the Citizens Committee endorsement of the old ballot form was spearheaded by the local League of
Women Voters.

The League argued on February 12, 1968, before the

Charter Review Committee that general law provisions regarding the
ballot form ,.,ere fairer to the public and should be adopted.

Their

position was that the essential question placed before the voters in
a recall election is to decide whether the person should be removed
from office, and i f so, who shall succeed him.

Under the old ballot,

they claimed, the question before the voter was "Who shall best
represent me?"

The League of Women Voters felt that the charter of

Palo Alto was not clear about

\o~hether

any particular councilman was

being taken off the council, or ,.,hether there was simply being a vote
of confidence.

The league held that they wished to make recall as

difficult as possible, therefore, they wished each specific councilman
to be recalled listed, and the "yes" and "no" on his particular recall
be voted upon.
In response, the Charter Review Committee objected principally
to the general law ballot on the basis that the incumbent must receive
a majority of the vote (over 50 percent) in order to remain in office,
whereas the candidate elected to replace him must receive only a
plurality vote, e. g. 40 percent.

It was felt, in the committee's

majority report, that the Palo Alto ballot avoids the paradox where
the person whose recall is sought might place his name on the list
.,.

.

of candidates, lose the recall vote, but win the election to fill
his own vacancy.8

~ajority Report of the Palo Alto Citizens Charter Review Committee
on Recall, 1968, pp. 8, 9.
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The debate regarding an incumbent's dismissal on a majority
vote, as compared to the election of his successor on a plurality,
also appeared in a recent litigation initiated by Seaside Councilwoman
Pearl Carey.

Carey argued that recall elections were unfair in that

a candidate running for a recallee's position is given the advantage
of running for office by winning only a plurality.

For example,

i f a recallee receives only 49.9 percent of the vote on the recall
questio~

he loses his seat while the candidate receiving a plurality

may succeed to the office with only 32 percent of the vote.

Carey's

attorneys took the position that "the idea that one group can be
granted grea t er voting strength than another is hostile to the one man,
one vote basis of our representative government.

Such a situation

lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Carey case, similar to the Palo Alto debate on this issue,
points out a criticism of the recall provision which has recently
been voiced by its critics.

The superior court has, however, stated

that Carey's arguments were constitutionally insubstantial. 9
Palo Alto's changes in signature requirement.
Palo Alto's Charter Review

Con~ittee

In 1968 while

was actively considering reforms,

the issue of signature requirement was raised.

The Palo Alto League

of Women Voters apparently came into this discussion with bitter memaries of the recall which took place during 1967.

The League apparently

wanted recall to become as difficult as possible to achieve and therefore orga nized a force to accomplish just that.10

Members of the com-

9More will b e said on this case in Chapter VI.
10Interview held with Mrs. Mason Myers, member of the Palo Alto
League of Women Voters, June 28, 1970.
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munity, who were also on the Charter Review Committee, were more sympathetic to recall and sought to preserve its essential character.
The Charter Review Committee proposed that the recall petition
signature requirement be change d from 20 percent of the vote cast in
the last preceding municipal election to 12 percent of the registered
voters.

The purpose was to avoid the wide fluctuation from year to

year in the number of signatures required for petitions under the
old charter.

The Committee offered the following statistics as

evidence that little numerical change would occur (Table VI).
As Table VI indicates, the number of required signatures remains,
under normal circumstances, approximately the same as under the old
charter 20 percent requirement.

The change was brought about more

for the sake of convenience than anything else.
Though the local League of Women Voters urged adoption of the
general law provisions, those who had run the previous 1961 recall
were still very much in evidence in the Charter Revision Commission
and managed to have the signature percentage requirement reduced.
Had Palo Alto revised this charter to adapt general law signature
requirements the figures would have looked like those in Table VII.
Table VII clearly indicates that recall would be much more
difficult to achieve under the general law provisions.

In the writer's

opinion, had the city adapted the 25 percent requirement under general
law, given the voting information above, the situation would be absurd
and a flagrant disregard of fairness for proponents of recall.
Palo Alto is illustrative of the need for specific charter recall
provisions that coincide more with discoverable patterns of local
electoral politics than with an arbitrary blanket provision as found
in the state's general l aw requirements.
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'TABLE VI
THE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES NEEDED FOR
RECALL UNDER PRESENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS FOR PALO ALToll

Election
Date

Regis t ered
Voters

Voted

20%
Voting

12%
Registered
Vote r s

1967

25,747

14,889

2,978

3,090

1965

27,377

9, 779

1,956

3,288

1963

23,891

13,936

2,788

2,868

TABLE VII
THE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES NEEDED FOR
RECALL IN PALO ALTO UNDER GENERAL LAW PROVISIONS

Election
Date

Registered
Voter s

Voted

Recall
(25%)

1967

25,747

14,889

6,437

1965

27,377

9, 779

6, 845

1963

23,891

13,936

5,976

11source of Tab l es VI and VII is from a study prepared by the
Citizens Charter Review Committee, 1968 .
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IV.

RECENT SIGNIFICANT TRENDS OF RECALL
IN HOME-RULE CITIES

There have been some important trends in home-rule municipal
recall.

These have usually been outgrowths of bitter community

conflict in which a recall effort was the primary cause.

Reforms

that have come about recently in cities regarding recall were usually
prompted by heated contests and enacted soon after the resulting
recall election.

Before considering case studies, a word must be

said about the state district recall politics such as found in Los
Angeles and Stockton.
Los Angeles and district recall.

The Los Angeles recall provi-

sions for City Councilman are based upon districts where 20 percent
of the total vote cast for all candidates in the last district election
is necessary to validate a recall petition.

According to the elections

office, this would average out for each district to be anywhere from
5,000 to 11,000 signatures.

Collecting these signatures is not an

insurmountable tas k considering proponents have six months for the
collection of signatures.
Recall in Los Angeles appears to be a dormant issue.

The last

councilman recalled was in 1945 and the last filing for the recall of
a councilman was in 1962 where the petition never met specifications
of law.

Even rumblings and threats of recall have not been extensive.

The city's present procedures for the recall come from the charter
which was revised in 1951 following the recall attempt on Mayor Fletcher
Bowron, who himself had come into office as a result of the 1938
Frank Shaw recall.

The Bowron recall attempt brought much litigation

which prompted revision of the charter.
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Los Angeles is a semi-partisan city, therefore, the scarcity of
recall might be the hesitancy of parties to engage in an otherwise
non-partisan effort which could quickly become partisan.

Parties

generally conceive recall efforts as being out of their role.

Since,

after all, they are habitual opponents of the office holders of the
other party, they would find it unseemly to attack an office holder
without waiting for an election.
Due to the lack of recall reform activity, Los Angeles apparently
is satisfied with its recall plan.

However, it must not be overlooked

that Los Angeles has not had extensive recall activity.

It is quite

possible that the city would seek immediate revision to enact more
stringent procedures, as did Palo Alto, following an especially heated
recall effort.

This has been the pattern of home-rule cities and the

charter revision of recall in 1951 fits into this increasingly popular
trend.
Drift toward general law provisions of recall in home-rule
municipalities.

In the few r emaining cities where recall is controlled

by special charter provisions there is an attempt to have recall come
unde r the general law as provided in the State Election Codes.

Such

a trend is significant in that it would make recall considerably more
difficult and pose, in most large cities , an insurmountable task to
prospective recall proponents.
Berkeley presents a prime example of this trend toward making
recall more difficult.

In October, 1964, the city of Berkeley exper-

ienced a bitter recall contest against several school board officials.
Following the divisive event, a campaign based on the belief that
recall was too easily achieved, attempted to have the twenty percent

lU.£

Berkeley requirementl2 raised to twenty-five percent of the registered
electors which is the same as in the general law.
The signature requirement change was accomplished in April of
1965, when memories were still smarting from the recall a year before.
In an interview, Edith Campbell, City Clerk of Berkeley, stated
that most city clerks probably favored the general law because it made
recall more difficult.

Campbell also expressed a point that has been

consistently held to · by most city officials interviewed.l3

This is

the practical argument that a city charter is much harder to change
than a general law code to which a charter might refer.

This is

desired by city officials according to Edith Campbell and was reiterated
by Ann Tanner, the City Clerk of Palo Alto.

Miss Tanner also expressed

the belief that recall was much too easy and should be made more
difficult. 1 4
The City of Long Beach has a rather vague recall section in its
charter.

Many of its provisions are similar to the general law, yet

it remains silent on strategic procedures that should be made known
to recall proponents.

Where the charter is silent on important rules

for recall, the State Election Code is employed.

This makes the

charter seem confusing and forces anyone ignorant of the law to refer
also to the State Codes besides the city charter.
12Twenty percent of the entire vote case for mayor at the last
preceding municipal election .
l3rnterview with Edith Campbell, City Clerk of Berkeley, February 23,
1972.
14rnterview with Ann Tanner, City Clerk of Palo Alto, February 23,
1972.
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The present signature requirement for Long Beach is twenty-five
percent of the vote cast in the last general municipal election .
City officials are, however, displeased with the present requirements
and are attempting to have the charter recall provisions changed over
to the State Election Codes.

Their express purpose for this change,

according to the city's election attorney, Ed Bennet, is to make
recall harder to achieve.

He said that the state law was a strict

law and would therefore discourage recall attempts within the city.lS
Bennet said that he did not believe in recall because it "does
not serve any useful purpose," is a lot of work, and "wrecks the
whole election process ."

He bases his dis like for recall on the

belief that it is too costly and is not fair to a politician who gets
"jittery" with the recall threat.

Bennet also held that since a

recall election brings out "unstable guys" who would vote against
anything, it is unfair to the incumbent who could just as well get
voted out at the r egular election rather than a bothersome special
one.
There was also a genuine fear on Bennet's part that he would
come under too much criticism because of the l ack of comple t eness
in the city's provisions.

He said that following a 1970 Long Beach

recall he r eceived a great deal of criticism and was afraid of being
taken to court, therefore he wanted to shift the responsibility
to the State Codes.
Bennet believed, as did other city officials, that the general
election law could be changed very easily and should at some point
lSrnforma tion on Long Beach gathered from interview with Ed Bennet,
Long Beach City Elections Attorney , February 23, 1972 .

lUlt

in the near future.

He maintained that the state provision of twenty-

five percent (registered electors) was still too low.

He seemed to

think that it would be much easier to change the general law rather
than the charter if ever a change was needed.
is just talk to my State Senator--boom!

"All I've got to do

You got it changed."

The hostility some Long Beach officials have against recall is
perhaps acute and not consistent with a majority viewpoint.

However,

these opinions are in keeping with the general view toward recall
which is at present a subdued disdain.

On May 9, 1972 the people of

Long Beach will vote on whether or not to change their recall to
general law provisions.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION:

RECALL IN PERSPECTIVE

Recall is but one facet of the political tradition in California.
It reflects the historical background of the s tate, and more broadly
is characte ristic of the principles of responsive government which
have become salient ideals of this country's political heritage.
The nature and course of its development as a democratic principle once considered "radical" is important and adds further insight
to the assessment of future experiments in the democratic process.
I.

OVERVIEH OF THE STATUTORY
DEVELOPMENT OF RECALL

The statutory l aw of recall has not been difficult to amend.
Major changes as well as small technical amendments have been carried
out with r e l ative ease.

In 1953, for example, the 12 percent signa-

ture requirement passed in the California Assembly by a vote of 49
to 2, with little debate.
A pattern of increased complexity can be observed in the l aw .
Numerous amendments to the original provisions have taken place,
most of which have been t echnical, thus affecting the law substantially.
Yet, it is significant that the legis lature h as not greatly disturbe d
the basic principles and reserved powers of the r ecall concept.
has taken note, evidently, of the sacros anct nature of reserved
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powers.

These powers, of which recall is a part, are inherent in

the people and are protected by the government, as provided in the
state constitution. 1
The procedure of recall, as first laid down in the organic law
and in the act dealing with municipal governments, was simple and
without complex technical measures.

Through its simplicity , however,

certain areas of the original provisions were left ambiguous.

l~ile

remedial l egislation was certainly expected and needed , the author
questions the justification for making recall more difficult while
trying to reform it.
The conceptual and legal framework for recall was established
in 1911 with its incorporation into the state constitution.

Consider-

able debate on its early abuses and weaknesses took place in the
early years following its adoption.

The 1915 and 1917 legislatures

were most active in the discussion of remedial legislation.
The period of major significance, however, was in the 1930's
when the general law of recall underwent major revisions.

Legislation

in 1931 established numerous basic procedural requirements in recall
such as pertains to circulation of the petition, major petition
requirements, and provisions for notification, response, and publication of the charges.
In 1939 the Political Statutes were codified for the first time
and incorporated into the State's Election Codes.

The codification

indexed the l aw, but did not substantially alter any of the provisions.
!california State Constitution, Article I, Section 2.
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Again in 1961 the election laws were recodified without substantQve
revision to the content.
During the period 1967 to 1970, amendments to the law of recall
were considerable. 2

The nature of the changes was remedial and mos t

often not aimed at recall specifically, but accompanied corrective
legislation in the whole body of election laws for the promotion of
greater efficiency, uniformity, and economy .

Yet, technical complexity

in any procedure performed by laymen has a hampering effect which can
easily induce discouragement .
It would seem sensible and more in keeping with the spirit of
direct democracy if in the near future the general law of recall
might be made simpler, less restrictive in its ma ze of rigid t e chnical
requirements, and more uniform.

Former Secretary of State, Pat

Sullivan, suggested a logical course when he observed that uniformity
should prevail in the procedural requirements for counties, cities,
and districts.3
While there appears to be no conscious effort on the part of
the legislature and its members to subvert r ecall, there is a danger
that it could become a victim of more protective requirements which
complicate the law and detract from procedural simplicity.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATION OF RECALL
Early in reca ll history the courts established a very liberal
attitude toward recall and consistently ruled in favor of letting the
2ouring this period, 17 revisions of a technical nature were made .
3rnterview with Pat Sullivan , January 14, 1971.
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issue go before the people whenever possible.

Yet, the relative ease

of litigation and stalling tactics in the courts often have defeated
the purpose of a liberal recall law.

Early established principles

which have guided the courts in their rulings on recall have consistently
involved liberal construction with a view to promoting the purpose for
which the charters have been enacted by the people.4
With the increasing amount of mandatory, self-executing provisions that the legislature has enacted in recent years, the courts
have gradually reversed the liberal tradition in its recall decisions. 5
This trend toward reinterpretation is not yet crucial, and is in many
cases proper, guarding against indiscriminate and irresponsible execution of the general law provisions.
A significant decision was rendered in 1966 by the court in Moore
v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892.

The ruling is important

because the court far exceeded the established tradition of judicial
interpretation in the matter of recall.

While the interpretation

rendered by the Moore court was far more liberal in substance than
granted by legislative intent, it established what the author believes
could become an unfortunate precedent of transcending original meaning
and eventually restricting recall.
A criticism pertaining to a highly significant question of law ·
has developed recently dealing with the principle of equal protection
4conn v. City Council, 17 c. A. 705 (1912).
5This is most noticeable in Chambers v. Glenn Colusa, 57 C. A. 155;
Maycock v. Ke rr, 216 C. 171; and Lee v . Superior Court 265 C. A. 2d
49. Contrast with Conn v . City Council, 17 C. A. 705; Worth v. Downey,
74 C. A. 632; Magoon v. He ath, 79 C. A. 632; and Cheste r v. Hall,
55 C. A. 611 in which the courts have taken a more liberal view to
the execution by proponents of technical requirements.
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under the law as provided in Amendments I and XIV of the United States
Constitution.
The issue of the case6 was argued by city council members whose
recall had been sought and consequently responded with a challenge
to the constitutionality of certain provisions in the recall procedure.
The respondents held that an incumbent in a recall proceeding must
poll at least 50 percent of the votes on the recall question (Election
Code, Section 27516), while the candidate to succeed to the office
must only win a plurality of votes cast (Section 27518).

In addition

to these alleged inequities, the incumbent is prohibited from being·
a candidate to succeed himself (Section 27516).
It was held in the argument that interjection of a slate of
candidates on the same ballot at the same election "materially subverts
the recall question, "7 by the introduction of an "extraneo.us issue. "8
The principle raised here is one of fairness to the incumbent who, it
is

a~gued,

procedure.

is being subjected to two different standards of election
The Superior Court of California in the County of Monterey

refused to issue a decision on the case due to insubstantial constitutiona! grounds.
There has been a noticeable lack of significant cases within the
last five years which prevents any determination of a pattern in cases.
6Pearl Carey, et al. v. City Council of the City of Seaside, et al.
(1971).
7In Petition for Writ of Mandate, Carey v. City of Seaside, June 18,
1971, p. 12.
8see above, p. 10.
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It does appear, however, that the courts will become as restrictive
as the increas ing legislation imposing stricter requirements on the
procedure.
III.

SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON RECALL

Recall is a reserved power of the people who have the authority
to exercise their judgments in matters of a political nature r egard ing
an official's behavior in office.

The recall is

un~que

in that it

allows for an official ' s dismissal on purely political grounds.

As

Bird and Ryan observe d, when an official is guilty of corruption,
clearly proven, his removal from office is not the proper function
of recall.9

Recall was not intended as r ecourse for criminal behavior.

Rather, its use is to be a form of last resort where citizens can
make judgments upon the performance of officials, based s olely on
politica l cons iderations.
In their study Bird and Ryan noted that one of the major criticisms of recall was its tendency to place the incumbent at a disadvantage with his opponents .

The official originally e lected in an

open-field election where only a plur ality is needed to win must stand
election in a bi-partisan contest, in which he must win a majority
of the vote . lO

They also point out that the form of ballot presently

used forces an official to win not only against his r ecord but against
a field of candidates .

It obscur es the main issue "by injecting into

the controversey an election campaign for a s uccessor ."ll
9Bird and Ryan , p . 347.
10Bird and Ryan, p. 81.
llBird and Ryan, p. 361.
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A more common criticism of recall in California is expressed by
Assemblyman James Hayes who believes that too often recall is used as
an irrespons ible weapon to harass and intimidate incumbents.

Hayes

contends that it is usually the disgruntled minority who initiates
the nuisance recall.12
Critics of recall charge that too often recall movements are
prompted by differences in political ideology which should have no
valid basis for grounds of recall, but should instead be aired at the
regular general election.
Some suggest that the solution to the above problem is to require
that grounds for recall be made more specific and legally definitive.
Assemblyman Hayes and former Secretary of State Pat Sullivan believe
that the charges for recall should be misfeasance, mal feasance, and
non-feas ance.l3
Generally, the grounds given for recall of an official are
shallow and usually amount to some general expression of disapproval
stated generically as incomp e tence or insufficiency.
inappropriate and leads to irresponsibility.

To some this is

Yet, because recall is a

political process, its grounds were intended to be based on political
considerations.

In providing for specific, legally defined grounds

for recall, there would be a danger, in effect, of destroying the
original recall concept.
12Assembly Interim Committee Report on Constitutional Amendments,
October 9, 1968, p. 25.
13
These views were expressed in separate interviews with Hayes and
Sullivan on January 19, 1971 and Augus t 17, 1971 respectively.
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Bird and Ryan observed in their study that recall is applied
almost entirely to political (or quasi-political) officials--seldom
to technical officials, such as a city clerk.

The same pattern has

held true to the present and is significant in that while technical
officials have the same opportunity to be s ubj ect to r ecall, the more
mechanical nature of their duties decreases the chances for politica lly
based charges against their performance.
Bird and Ryan observed a correlation between the incidence of
recall and the s ize of the political unit in their study.

They

maintained that the difficulty in using the recall is " somewhat in
proportion to the size of the population. •

nl4

This situation is no less a problem today and has in fact increased.

The achievement of a recall in one of California's large

urban centers, especially under the general la\-1 requirements, is a
most difficult task.

In view of the considerable metropolitan growth

since the early twentieth century, it would seem more politically
correct--and more in keeping with the progressive spirit of direct
democracy--to amend the general law, basing petition signature r equir ements upon various population categories.

Perhaps a better general

law regarding signature requirements for municipal recall petitions
might be as in Table VIII.
Basing the signature requirement on a sliding population scale
would contribute an element of fairness to recall l aw that is needed
in this age when the gulf between popular control and bureaucratic
self-perpetuation is an ever widening phenomenon.

It would also repre-

sent a much needed move to achieve electoral reform.
14Bird and Ryan, pp. 190-191.
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TABLE VIII
PROPOSED SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT

Population

Percent of Registered
Voters of the City

500,000+

12%

100,000500,000

15%

10,000100,000

20%

5,00010,000

25%
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IV.

RECALL AND ELECTORAL ASSOUNTABILITY

Professor John Vieg has suggested an appropriate context within
which recall might be considered:
This game of democratic politics • • • is the greatest game
men have ever devised, its purpose being nothing less than the
taming of power, the civilizing of it by making it responsible.l5
Recall is a legitimate tool for taming the power of political elites.
I t brings into play the effective ability of electoral " checks and

balances" and encourages greater discretion upon the part of political
l eaders.

Its execution, and the mere threat alone, should serve as

a substantial deterrent against political leadership that has become
entrenched and oligarchial.l6
One of the possible benefits to accrue from the recall is a
sharpening of electoral accountability where an official has exhibited
only minimal concern for his constituency.
Use, or threat of recall, if it is credible, tends to increase
a public servant's political self-consciousness.

It is through recall

that electors may force their officials to face up to the reality of
their future success in office.

Joseph A. Schlesinger points to the

importance of this function when he states:

"No more irresponsible

government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for
their political futures."l7
l5Quoted from testimony given by Professor Vieg before the California
State Legislature ' s Commission on Constitutional Amendments, mimeograph
entitled "Revision of the California Constitution, Phase III: Article
XXIII--Recall of Public Officers." October 9, 1968, p. 80.
l6see Kenneth Prewitt's study, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism,
and Electoral Accountabil ity, " American Political Science Review ,
64:14, March, 1970.
l7Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1966), p. 2 .
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In a recall effort, officials are made more fully aware of the
people's power, and it creates dialogue where the official must justify
his performance in office and scrutinize more judiciously his future
behavior in relationship to the community.
V.

THE RECALL CONCEPT AFTER 50 YEARS

In his biennia l message to the 1915 Legislature, Hiram Johnson
conceded that recall had been subject to wide abuse and that defects
existed in his program of direct legislation.

It was widely recognized

in the early days of recall history that the law and its application
often did not measure up to popular expectations.l8
Recall has not become the panacea t o the ills of democracy as
the California progressives had hoped.
democracy, it has fared

Yet, as an experiment in

remarkably well, withstanding abuse, villi-

fication, and pere nnial revision.

While it is being made harder to

achieve, recall has remained consistent in principle to its bas ic
tenets

of . reserved powers to the people.

There appears no threat

to the existence of recall, however, constant vigilance must assure
that its functional application not become eroded .
Like any democratic concept, recall has been, and will continue
to be, susceptible to abuse .

Democratic principles which reserve

political authority to citizens will not be without those weaknesses
inherent in human nature itself.
18Franklin Hichborn, Story of the California Legislature of 1915
(San Francisco: James H. Barry Company, 1916), p. 102.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The author in this study has attempted to illustrate the difficulties and restrictions which have gradually been placed in the way
of the recall process.

Much emphasis has been made of original intent

throughout the paper because the writer is convinced that the proposals
put forth by the early California Progressives, such as recall, were
politically poignant measures, aimed at opening channels of the
political process in order that the electorate might be allowed more
direct control of their political situation.

These measures of direct

democracy--initiative, referendum, and recall--were in their original
form somewhat crude, not fully developed and often ambiguous, yet the
spirit--the original intent--was one of simplicity and cogency which
could be comprehended by those unaccustomed to an otherwise sophisticated
political process.
While recall is not a perfect answer to the problems of local
politics, it has served as a useful tool where people may initiate
their own political action in an attempt to penetrate problems derived
from improper or inadequate representation.
In the hope that recall will provide an open and healthy channel
for conflict resolution--without further restrictions and obstacles
placed in its path--the author urges retention of recall in a form
that best serves popular control over political incumbents.
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